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INTRODUCTION
"[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government
itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?'"
Two hundred and thirty-one years ago the founders created a
nation whose citizens would be vested with certain unalienable
rights-rights that remain an integral part of America today. Key
among them are the principles of "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness, '3 which shaped the bedrock of our democracy.
Accordingly, those who conceived of this nation saw fit to
guarantee citizens certain civil liberties and carefully inscribe
those guarantees in our most revered document, the Constitution.
In a similar vein, the framers of the Constitution intently
concentrated on national security matters and enshrined
numerous protections in that same document, knowing that
attention to such matters would be vital to the nation's success
and longevity. In the end, the representatives of thirteen inchoate
states approved a well-balanced set of guarantees, ensuring both
the nation's enjoyment of continued survival and its citizens'
enjoyment of great liberties.
Recently, however, the War on Terror 4 has brought that
sacred document and its cherished rights back under microscopic
scrutiny in response to an outpouring of allegations that certain
2. Abraham Lincoln, Speech to' Special Session of Congress (July 4,
1861), as reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter 4 COLL. WORKS]. Lincoln's words were
uttered in response to critics who contend that Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution authorizes only Congress and not the President to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus.
3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
4. The War on Terror refers to the various military actions taken to
break down terrorist cells throughout the world and curtail the spread of
terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. See
generally 9/11 FIVE YEARS LATER: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES (2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/waronterror/2006/waronterror
0906.pdf.
President Bush has explained: "[T]he world has come together to fight a
new and different war, the first, and we hope the only one of the 21st century.
[It is a] war against all those who seek to export terror, and a war against
those governments that support or shelter them." George W. Bush, Prime
Time News Conference (Oct. 11, 2001), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html.
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civil liberties guaranteed in the Constitution have been tread
upon in the name of national security.
Such criticism constantly makes headlines while we fight the
War on Terror, a war that arose in the context of threats to the
United States unlike any it previously had faced. 5 The United
States is engaged in battle with an enemy it cannot see, and, as it
attempts to ward off enemy combatants 6 both at home and abroad,
it is subject to immense scrutiny around the globe. At the same
time, the very real threat of another attack continues to cast a
dark cloud over the nation. 7
Despite this wartime climate, many Americans remain less
than sympathetic to our government's efforts to strengthen
homeland security and locate terrorists who seek to jeopardize our
nation's security and well-being. 8 Instead, many lament that
President George W. Bush has sweepingly abrogated some civil
liberties of those detained in Guant~namo Bay, Cuba, an
allegation that, as we attempt to demonstrate here, could not be
5. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity
with the National Security Team (Sept. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/O9/200lO912-4.html; see also
Rebecca Grant, An Air War Like No Other, 86 AIR FORCE J. 30, 30-36 (2002).
6. The laws of war recognize two types of combatants: lawful and
unlawful. Lawful combatants wear a uniform or don an emblem, and they
adhere to the laws and customs of war. As such, they may be captured and
detained as prisoners of war. See Louis FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 221
(2005) (citing Hague Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2296). By contrast,
unlawful combatants, sometimes referred to as enemy combatants are not
uniformed and do not adhere to the laws of war. They may be captured and
detained, and they may be tried by a military tribunal for their unlawful
actions. See id.; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942). The
Military Commissions Act of 2006 recognizes this distinction. See United
States Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w and other sections of titles
10, 18, 28, and 42) [hereinafter MCA].
7. George W. Bush, President's Radio Address (Aug. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/print/20060812.html.
8. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK:
PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006); JOSEPH
MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006); THE
WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (Richard C.
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003). See also Mark Mazzetti & David E.
Sanger, Al Qaeda Threatens; U.S. Frets, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2007, § 1, at 12
(noting that al Qaeda is stronger now than ever before and is currently
plotting new attacks).
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more untrue. Their critique is twofold. First, critics question the
government's decision to try suspected alien unlawful enemy
combatants by military commission, urging that the civil liberties
of such persons are jeopardized by refusing them access to civilian
courts. 9 Second, critics relentlessly contend that the Constitution
requires those individuals detained during the War on Terror,
including alien unlawful enemy combatants, be afforded an
immediate opportunity to challenge their detention before an
Article III court l0 by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus." 1
Addressing allegations that the Bush administration has
violated the Constitution with its policies concerning judicial
treatment of detainees' claims, Associate Justice Stephen G.
Breyer of the United States Supreme Court has cogently
articulated the government's obligation: "The Constitution always
matters, perhaps particularly so in times of emergency.... Security
needs may well matter, playing a major role in determining just
where the proper constitutional balance lies."'1 2 It is this proper
constitutional balance of both civil liberties and national security
that our three co-equal branches of government have worked
rigorously to attain amidst the current wartime climate. 13
One of the means the government has employed to achieve
that constitutional balance is the establishment of special military
commissions, replete with procedural safeguards, for the purpose
of trying alien unlawful enemy combatants. 14 To implement this
process, the right of detainees to initiate an immediate review of
their detention before an Article III judicial branch court has
admittedly taken a backseat to the overriding need to protect
9. See infra Part VI.A.
10. Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power
of the United States in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art.
III.
11. See infra Part VI.B.
12. Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Address before the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Liberty, Security, and the Courts (Apr. 14,
2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-04-
15-03.html.
13. Id.
14. MCA, supra note 6. Importantly, the MCA only applies to alien
unlawful enemy combatants. Id. at § 948b(a). Under the act, the term
"alien" means a person who is not a citizen of the United States. Id. at §
948a(3).
STILL A FRIGHTENING UNKNOWN
America and its citizens. In the place of the immediate right to
challenge one's detention, combined provisions of the United
States Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) 15 and the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), 16 establish a unique four-
layered process, ensuring that alien unlawful enemy combatants
are treated with fairness and integrity throughout the Article I,
executive branch, process. 17
Despite the government's efforts to create a military tribunal
system that, consistent with American tradition and the laws of
war, affords a panoply of procedural protections to alien unlawful
enemy combatants, the protocol has become the subject of
significant criticism from numerous politicians, journalists, and
academics. Nevertheless, the government's decisions have
garnered some support from members of the judiciary-the Article
III courts. The recent decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Boumediene v.
Bush,'8 marked the first recognition by an appellate court in the
post-9/11 era that the Constitution does not constitute a "suicide
pact"'19 during the War on Terror. To the dismay of alien unlawful
enemy combatants, the decision represented a turning point and
an affirmation by one Circuit Court that exchanging habeas
corpus review for a four-stage judicial review process is
constitutional and achieves the sought-after balance. 20
It was thought that the Boumediene decision would settle
significant debate over the MCA's constitutionality given the
United States Supreme Court's initial denial of certiorari review
15. MCA, supra note 6.
16. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000dd (Lexis 2005)
[hereinafter DTA].
17. See MCA, supra note 6; DTA, supra note 16.
18. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1478, cert. granted, Boumediene v. Bush, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 29,
2007) (No. 06-1195).
19. The precise origin of this expression is unknown. Although some
have attributed it to Abraham Lincoln, the term "suicide pact" does not
appear to have been used in any official document until Associate Justice
Robert H. Jackson's dissent in Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Justice Jackson's very prescient comment in that dissent was: "There is
danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little
practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a
suicide pact." Id. at 37.
20. See infra. Part IV.A.
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of that case. 21 However, in a most unusual move, for the first time
in over 60 years, 22 the Supreme Court reversed its previous denial
of certiorari and granted the petition. 23 The Supreme Court is
expected to consider that case during its fall 2007 term.24
This Article does not advocate that the system used to, try
detainees should be revamped, nor does it argue what process
should be used to protect the nation in such dire times. 25 Rather,
the authors contend that the system currently in place is a
rational, plausible, and historically consistent approach which, at
a minimum, satisfies our Constitution and the laws of war.
Accordingly, this Article presents historical, legal, and policy
reasons in support of a satisfactory balance between civil liberties
and our national security as they relate to non-United States
citizens.
In so doing, this Article argues that the current process,
which does not altogether deprive detainees of a right of access to
Article III courts, but rather merely delays such access while
ensuring four levels of review, is necessary to safeguard the
country during this national emergency. Part I of this Article
focuses on Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution, which authorizes the suspension of habeas corpus
"when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it, ''26 and proceeds to outline the history of the suspension
of the Great Writ. Criticism surrounding the Bush
administration's decisions about how to safeguard the United
States seems to these writers to be particularly ill-founded when
one considers that the President's actions pale in comparison to
21. Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478
(2007).
22. See David G. Savage & Carol J. Williams, High Court to Reconsider
Guantanamo; In a Rare Reversal of Themselves, the Justices Agree to Weigh
Detainees' Right to their Day in Federal Court, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at
AL
23. Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478, cert. granted,
Boumediene v. Bush, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195).
24. Savage, supra note 22.
25. The authors understand that there are broader issues with respect to
the War on Terror, ranging from strategies and tactics to our government's
call at home for men and women to fight in defense of our nation. Although
these issues are beyond the sc6pe of this Article, the authors in no way mean
to depreciate the importance of these issues.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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actions taken by prior presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln, who,
despite his widespread suspension of habeas corpus, is still ranked
among the nation's greatest leaders. 27 Lincoln's actions, although
radical, were necessary during the Civil War, as now, when grave
national security problems were pandemic. 28
Almost 150 years later, the Bush administration, like Lincoln,
is faced with yet another grave national emergency that requires
unpopular decisions. Part II of this Article identifies the national
security concerns that have beset our nation both before and in
the aftermath of September 11, 2001. During this time, alien
unlawful enemy combatants, who are motivated by a form of
diabolical nihilism and whose goals are antithetical to the bedrock
principles upon which our nation was founded, seek to cloak
themselves with privileges deeply engrained in our democracy.
For example, such individuals contend that they should be
afforded our constitutional right of habeas corpus, despite their
avowed purpose of destroying America and its citizens, the nation
which guarantees the very rights they are intent on obliterating.
The Constitution was never intended for this purpose. 29 Part II
further illustrates that, although in these times we are a far more
vulnerable country than ever before, given the magnitude of the
threat of harm to our nation and the horrific tools available to our
nihilistic enemies, there continues to be even sharper criticism of
the Bush administration's methods of safeguarding our
homeland. 30
Part III of this Article analyzes the United States Supreme
27. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., RATING THE PRESIDENTS:
WASHINGTON TO CLINTON, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 179, 189 (1997) (ranking Lincoln
the greatest United States president); Wall Street Journal and Federalist
Society Poll, 2005, as reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, RATING THE
BEST AND WORST IN THE WHITE HOUSE 11 (James Taranto & Leonard Leo eds.,
2005) (ranking Lincoln the second greatest United States president, just after
George Washington); Lydia Saad, Lincoln Resumes Position as Americans'
Top-Rated President, THE GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 19, 2007,
available at http://www.galluppoll.com/content/Default.aspx?ci=26608&
VERSION=p; ABC News Poll, Feb. 16-20, 2000, available at
http://www.pollingreport.com/wh-hstry.htm (ranking Lincoln the greatest
United States president).
28. See infra Part 1B.
29. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR
ON TERROR 144 (2006).
30. See infra Part II.
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Court's struggle to strike a constitutional balance between civil
liberties and national security in decisions such as Rasul v.
Bush,31 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,32 Rumsfeld v. Padilla,33 and, most
recently, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.34
Part IV of this Article analyzes Congress's simultaneous
struggle to achieve that same balance through legislation such as
the Detainee Treatment Act of 200535 and the United States
Military Commissions Act of 2006.36
Part V takes a comprehensive look at the landmark decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Boumediene v. Bush,37 the first appellate decision to
review and declare at least one portion of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 constitutional. 38
Finally, Part VI offers critical analysis and policy reasons in
support of the Bush administration's efforts to protect the United
States by placing the need for national security at this time,
somewhat higher in its hierarchy of values than certain aspects of
individual civil liberties, especially as they relate to alien enemy
combatants. 39
I. SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME
"Civil liberties depend on national security in a broader sense.
Because they are the point of balance between security and liberty,
a decline in security causes the balance to shift against liberty ...
[W]ithout physical security there is likely to be very little liberty.'40
A. Affording citizens a right of habeas corpus
Often known as the "Great Writ of Liberty,"'41 habeas corpus 42
31. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
32. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
33. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
34. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
35. DTA, supra note 16.
36. MCA, supra note 6.
37. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1478, cert. granted, Boumediene v. Bush, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 29,
2007) (No. 06-1195).
38. See infra Part V.
39. See infra Part VI.
40. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 46-47 (2006).
41. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT
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is the constitutionally authorized means by which a court may
immediately assume jurisdiction and inquire into the legality of
an individual's detention.4 3 If a court, upon making this inquiry,
concludes that an individual has been unlawfully detained, it is
empowered to immediately release him or her.44
As the framers of the Constitution took pains to make clear,
the privilege is by no means absolute. In August of 1787, a great
debate took place on the floor of the Constitutional Convention4 5
over what evolved into the suspension clause in Article I, Section
9.46 Federalists like James McHenry reported back to their
constituencies about the compromises made at the convention. In
a speech to the Maryland legislature, McHenry explained that
"[p]ublic safety may require suspension of the [Habeas] Corpus in
cases of necessity: when those cases do not exist, the virtuous
Citizen will ever be protected in his opposition to power, 'till
corruption shall have obliterated any sense of Honor & Virtue
from a Brave and free People. 47
As is evident from the resulting Constitution, the Federalists
prevailed; they succeeded in balancing this important civil liberty
with the recognized need for public safety.4 8 That balance was
achieved by authorizing, in explicit constitutional language, the
suspension of habeas corpus "when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it. ' 'a9 As history would
later confirm, the framers of our Constitution wisely included such
OF LIBERTY 1 (2001).
42. The suspension clause, as set forth in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of
the Constitution, reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
43. FREEDMAN, supra note 41, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Individual Liberties Within the Body of the
Constitution: A Symposium: Thinking about Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES.
748, 752 (1987).
46. FREEDMAN, supra note 41, at 12.
47. Id. at 17. (quoting Speech of James McHenry to the Maryland House
of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), as reprinted in Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in
Habeas Corpus: Part I: Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It
So: Ex parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L.
REV. 531, 554 (2000)).
48. Id.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; POSNER, supra note 40, at 54.
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a provision, foreseeing that there would be times of national
emergency that would require relinquishing some civil liberties to
some degree to concentrate on concerns about public safety and
national security. Less than a century later, the framers' concerns
became a reality.
B. Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus
In April 1861, on the heels of the bombardment of Fort
Sumter in Charleston Harbor by Confederate forces, Lincoln
called for reinforcements to protect Washington, D.C. 50
Responding to Lincoln's call for state militias, the Sixth
Massachusetts Regiment arrived in Baltimore, where riots
congested the streets and rioters attempted to prevent troops from
reaching Washington. 51 The regiment from Massachusetts forged
its way from one railroad station to another, sustaining twelve
deaths with several more soldiers being wounded. 52 By then, the
Civil War was underway. The nation's capital was in jeopardy,
given that it was bordered by Virginia, a secessionist state, and
Maryland, whose threats to secede were widely known. 53
Newspaper headlines loudly proclaimed the horror endured by the
soldiers passing through Baltimore. Giving America a glimpse of
that horror, The New York Times reported: "It is said there have
been 12 lives lost. Several are mortally wounded. Parties of men
half frantic are roaming the streets armed with guns, pistols and
50. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening
Congress (Apr. 15, 1861), as reprinted in 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 430;
see also ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A DOCUMENTARY PORTRAIT THROUGH His
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 160-62 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1964).
Responding to the fact that Confederate troops had opened fire on Fort
Sumter, Lincoln called out the militia of the several states of the Union and
convened a special session of Congress.
51. DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 16 (2003).
52. An April 19, 1861 headline in the New York Times read: "Startling
From Baltimore: The Northern Troops Mobbed and Fired Upon - The Troops
Return the Fire - Four Massachusetts Volunteers Killed and Several
Wounded - Several of the Rioters Killed." LINCOLN IN THE TIMES: THE LIFE OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AS ORIGINALLY REPORTED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES 110-11
(David Herbert Donald & Harold Holzer eds., 2005) [hereinafter LINCOLN IN
THE TIMES].
53. Frank J. Williams, Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties: Then and
Now - The Southern Rebellion and September 11, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY OF
AM. LAW 466 (2004); see also MICHAEL LIND, WHAT LINCOLN BELIEVED: THE
VALUES AND CONVICTIONS OF AMERICA'S GREAT PRESIDENT 174 (2004).
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muskets ... a general state of dread prevails. a54 In the days and
weeks that followed, the city of Washington was virtually severed
from the states of the North. 55  Troops stopped arriving,56
telegraph lines were slashed,57 and postal mail from the North
reached the city only infrequently. 58
Lincoln immediately perceived the grave danger that the war
would be lost if the Confederates seized the capital or caused it to
be completely isolated, but he was reluctant to suspend the Great
Writ.59 Finally, prompted by the urging of his Secretary of State,
William H. Seward, Lincoln, an attorney, concluded that the
suspension of habeas corpus could not wait.60 Although Congress
was in recess, Lincoln, relying on the constitutional authorization
that the framers had perceptively included years before, issued a
proclamation suspending the writ, believing that his duty to
protect the capital and the Union required such an action.6 1
54. LINCOLN IN THE TIMES, supra note 52, at 110-11.
55. Williams, supra note 53, at 466.
56. LIND, supra note 53, at 174.
57. LINCOLN IN THE TIMES, supra note 52, at 110-11.
58. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 22 (1998); see also
Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), as reprinted in
5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 518, 524 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
Rutgers University Press, 1953) [hereinafter 5 COLL. WORKS].
59. At one point, Lincoln ruminated that bombarding cities in Maryland
would be a preferable alternative to suspending the writ of habeas corpus.
See Abraham Lincoln, Order to General Winfield Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), as
reprinted in 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 344.
60. REHNQUIST, supra note 58, at 23 (quoting A Day with Governor
Seward at Auburn, as reprinted in F.B. Carpenter, Seward Papers, No. 6634
(July 1870)).
61. On April 27, 1861 Abraham Lincoln reluctantly ordered General
Winfield Scott to suspend habeas corpus where necessary to avoid the
overthrow of the government and to protect the nation's capital:
To The Commanding General of the Army of the United States:
You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws
of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any
military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of
Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which
renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the
public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at
the point where resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend the
writ.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
Abraham Lincoln, Order to General Winfield Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), as
reprinted in 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 344.
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Lincoln's unilateral suspension of habeas corpus between
Washington and Philadelphia was instrumental in securing
communication lines to the nation's capital. 62 The effect was to
enable military commanders to arrest and detain individuals
indefinitely in areas where martial law had been imposed.63
Many of those detained were individuals who attempted to halt
military convoys. 64 Lincoln saw that immediate action and a
declaration of martial law was necessary to divest civil liberties
from those who were disloyal and whose overt acts against the
United States threatened its survival without the rights explicit in
our usual judicial process.65
Nevertheless, Lincoln's actions did not go unchallenged;
criticism was not lacking. Despite the urgent situation that
warranted Lincoln's suspension of habeas during the Civil War,
his critics bemoaned his decision as an act of civil disobedience, 66
and they deemed his actions illegal.67 Lincoln himself responded
to such criticism in a message to a special session of Congress on
July 4, 1861. In Lincoln's words:
The provision of the Constitution that "[t]he privilege of
habeas corpus, shall not be suspended unless when, in
cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may
require it," is equivalent to a provision - is a provision -
that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of
rebellion, or invasion, the public safety does require it. It
was decided that the public safety does require the
qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which
was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that
Congress, and the Executive, is vested with this power.
But the Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who,
is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly
made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed
62. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
146 (1980).
63. LIND, supra note 53, at 174.
64. See LINCOLN IN THE TIMES, supra note 52, at 117.
65. POSNER, supra note 40, at 45.
66. See NEELY, supra note 1, at xvi; POSNER, supra note 40, at 85-86
(describing civil disobedience as an act of a private individual who feels a
moral obligation and duty to disobey a particular positive law).
67. B.F. McClerren, Op-Ed, Lincoln's Actions May Apply Today, TIMES-
COURIER, Nov. 19, 2001.
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that the framers of the instrument intended, that in
every case, the danger should run its course, until
Congress could be called together; the very assembling of
which might be prevented, as was intended in this case,
by the rebellion.68
Lincoln explained that his actions were not only justified, but
were required of him pursuant to his oath to preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution of the United States. 69 In August 1861,
Congress ratified the President's actions in all respects. 70
To Lincoln, there was no tolerable middle road. He was
acutely aware that some citizens would sharply criticize him for
suspending the Great Writ. The alternative, however, was far
worse in his estimation. In Lincoln's judgment nothing would be
worse than allowing the nation to succumb to Confederate forces.
Even some of those who deemed Lincoln's actions unconstitutional
have noted the real-world emergency with which he was faced.
One commentator has noted: "Lincoln's unconstitutional acts
during the Civil War show that even legality must sometimes be
sacrificed for other values. We are a nation under law, but first
we are a nation. '71
68. Abraham Lincoln, Speech to Special Session of Congress (July 4,
1861), as reprinted in 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 430.
69. Id. (Lincoln's actual words were: "Even in such a case, would not the
official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was
believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?"). See
also JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THIS MIGHTY SCOURGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
CIVIL WAR 211 (2007) (noting that Lincoln's oath imposed a larger duty that
"overrode his obligation to heed a lesser specific provision in the
Constitution").
The oath that every president must take before entering on the execution
of that high office is explicitly set forth in Article II, Section 1 of the
Constitution. It should also be recalled that the Preamble to the Constitution
specifically states that providing "for the common defence" and "securing the
blessings of liberty" are among the goals which the Constitution is intended
to serve.
70. Act of August 6, 1861, ch. 63, Sec. 3, 12 Stat. 326. Although this
language did not expressly ratify the President's suspension of habeas
corpus, it was widely understood as having done so. See BRIAN MCGINTY,
LINCOLN AND THE COURT ch. 3, 29 (forthcoming Harvard University Press Feb.
15, 2008).
71. Richard A. Posner, The Truth about our Liberties, in RIGHTS VS.
PUBLIC SAFETY AFTER 911: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 27 (Amitai
Etzioni & Jason H. Marsh eds., 2003).
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1. The Case of John Merryman
Only a month after Lincoln's proclamation, Captain Samuel
Yohe, empowered by Lincoln's suspension of habeas, entered the
Baltimore home of John Merryman, a discontented American who
had spoken out vigorously against President Lincoln and had
actively recruited a company of Confederate soldiers. 72 There, he
arrested Merryman for various acts of treason, including his
leadership of the secessionist group that conspired to destroy and
ultimately did destroy railroad bridges after the Baltimore riots.73
The government believed that Merryman's decision to form an
armed group to overthrow the government was an act far beyond a
simple expression of dissatisfaction, which would be protected
under the Constitution.
Merryman's attorney sought a writ of habeas corpus, 74
directing his petition to Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger
Brooke Taney. 75 Lawyers for Merryman suspected that Chief
Justice Taney would entertain the petition in Washington, 76 but
because he was then assigned to the Circuit Court sitting in
Maryland, 77 he took up the matter in Baltimore and granted the
72. 1 JOHN T. MORSE, JR., AMERICAN STATESMAN: ABRAHAM LINCOLN 287
(1921); 4 JOHN G. NiCOLAY & JOHN HAY, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY 174
(New York, The Century Co. 1890).
73. DUKER, supra note 62, at 147.
74. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md.1861).
75. Interestingly, Merryman's attorney filed the writ with Chief Justice
Taney, not as a circuit judge but in his capacity as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. Some historians believe this decision was made because
Merryman's counsel sought to circumvent the Circuit Court, whose writs of
habeas corpus had been ignored by military commanders in another case.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of
Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 81, 90-91
n.27 (1993) (citing 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE:
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 842 (1974)).
76. See, e.g., Arthur T. Downey, The Conflict Between the Chief Justice
and the Chief Executive: Ex parte Merryman, 31 J. OF SUPREME CT. HIST. 262,
262-78 (2006).
77. Apart from their duties on the Supreme Court, it was customary at
that time for Supreme Court justices to work also as Circuit Court justices.
Each Supreme Court justice was assigned to one of the seven circuits.
District Court judges in the area were paired with the Supreme Court justice
assigned to that circuit and would hold Circuit Court together. If a Supreme
Court justice was unable to attend, in some instances, a District Court judge
would hold Circuit Court alone. 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 248
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writ. 78 Despite Chief Justice Taney's demand to have Merryman
brought before the court, the commander of the fort where
Merryman was detained, George Cadwalader, respectfully
refused, relying on President Lincoln's suspension of habeas
corpus. 79  Outraged, Chief Justice Taney authored Ex parte
Merryman, opining that Congress alone had the power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus. 8 0
Although the case is published in the Federal Cases reporter
and labeled as a case from the April 1861 term of the Circuit
Court for the District of Maryland, the original opinion, in Chief
Justice Taney's longhand, is captioned "Before the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States at Chambers.' s
Unfortunately for Chief Justice Taney, his words carried no
precedential value as an in-chambers opinion.8 2 Chief Justice
Taney recognized this but forwarded his in chambers opinion to
President Lincoln.83 Ironically, it was Taney who, only a month
before, had administered the President's oath,84 which the
President now relied upon to justify his actions.
If one thing is certain, it is that Chief Justice Taney's opinion
did not deter Lincoln. Rather, Lincoln turned to Attorney General
Edward Bates for confirmation that his decision to suspend
(1974). Circuit justices were responsible for disposing of applications arising
in cases from state and federal courts within that circuit. These applications
included requests for bail, certificates of appealability, extensions of time,
injunctions, stays, writs of habeas corpus, and writs of error or appeal.
Cynthia J. Rapp, In Chambers Opinions by Justices of the Supreme Court, 5
GREEN BAG 2d 181, 182-83 (2002).
78. Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 145, 147.
79. See, e.g., Downey, supra note 76, at 262-78.
80. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147. The Chief Justice pointed to
the suspension clause found in Article I of the Constitution, which outlines
congressional duties.
81. SWISHER, supra note 77, at 848.
82. Typically, a Circuit Justice would either grant or deny the application
before him. Occasionally, however, Circuit Justices would issue an in
chambers opinion explaining the reasons for their decisions. Rapp, supra
note 77, at 182. These opinions were typically brief and were not circulated
to the full court before release. Id.
83. FARBER, supra note 51, at 17; see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME
COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 12 (2007)
(stating that "Taney went out of his way to mock the president, circulating
his opinion as widely as possible to embarrass the administration.").
84. MCGINTY, supra note 70, at ch. 1, 4.
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habeas corpus was within his authority.8 5 Bates responded as
follows:
I am clearly of opinion that, in a time like the present,
when the very existence of the nation is assailed, by a
great and dangerous insurrection, the President has the
lawful discretionary power to arrest and hold in custody
persons known to have criminal intercourse with the
insurgents, or persons against whom there is probable
cause for suspicion of such criminal complicity.8 6
Disregarding the in chambers opinion of Chief Justice Taney,
Lincoln boldly broadened the scope of the suspension of the writ.8 7
In the draft of Lincoln's report to Congress (the only extant copy of
his speech of July 4, 1861),88 he passionately defended his
position:
The whole of the laws which were required to be
faithfully executed, were being resisted, and failing of
execution, in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be
allowed to finally fail of execution? .. .[A]re all the laws,
but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to
pieces, lest that one be violated?89
Lincoln ardently explained that the outbreak of the Civil War
made it necessary "to call out the war power of the government
and so to resist force employed for the destruction by force for its
85. Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Edward Bates (May 30, 1861), as
reprinted in 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 390.
86. 10 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, ADVISING THE PRESIDENT AND HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS IN RELATION TO
THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES 81 (W.H. & O.H. Morrison 1868).
87. Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Henry W. Halleck (Dec. 2, 1861), as
reprinted in 5 COLL. WORKS, supra note 58, at 35; Abraham Lincoln,
Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sept. 24, 1862), as
reprinted in 5 COLL. WORKS, supra note 58, at 436-37; Abraham Lincoln,
Proclamation Suspending Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sept. 15, 1863), as
reprinted in 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 451-52 (Roy P.
Basler ed., Rutgers University Press, 1953) [hereinafter 6 COLL. WORKS]; see
also FARBER, supra note 51, at 159.
88. No official copy of Lincoln's speech of July 4, 1861 has been found.
The cited text is Lincoln's second proof, which contains his final revisions.
See 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 421 n.1.
89. Abraham Lincoln, Speech to Special Session of Congress (July 4,
1861), as reprinted in 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 430.
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preservation."90  Lincoln further professed that his actions,
"whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what
appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting
then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them."9 1
Although the Constitution is silent with respect to which
branch of government is authorized to exercise the power to
suspend habeas, Lincoln's words reflected his own belief that he
had exercised a power that required at least some cooperation and
approval from Congress.92  Whatever confusion remained
regarding the legality of Lincoln's unilateral suspension of habeas
was quelled two years later when Congress, in addition to its
previous ratification of August 6, 1861,93 enacted legislation
empowering the President to suspend the writ nation-wide while
rebellion continued. 94
2. The Case of Clement L. Vallandigham
On September 24, 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation,
declaring martial law and authorizing the use of military
tribunals to try civilians within the United States who are
believed to be "guilty of disloyal practice" or who "afford[ed] aid
and comfort to Rebels. '95  This was just the beginning. The
following March, Lincoln appointed Major General Ambrose
Burnside as commanding general of the Department of the Ohio.96
After only one month in that position, Burnside issued General
Order No. 38, authorizing imposition of the death penalty for
those who aided the Confederacy and who "declared sympathies
for the enemy."9 7
90. Id. at 426.
91. Id. at 429.
92. Id. at 431.
93. See supra text accompanying note 70.
94. Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 80, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).
95. See Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sept. 24,
1862), as reprinted in 5 COLL. WORKS, supra note 58, at 436-37. Over 2,000
cases were tried by military tribunals during the Civil War and the
Reconstruction Period. LEONARD CUTLER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LAW OF
WAR: MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND ENEMY COMBATANTS POST 9/11 4 (2005).
96. See Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War
Speech in the Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 105, 119 (1998).
97. General Order No. 38, as reprinted in BENJAMIN.PERLEY POORE, THE
LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE, SOLDIER-CITIZEN-
STATESMAN 206 (1882).
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With this order as justification, military officials arrested
anti-war Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio for a
public speech he delivered in Mount Vernon, lambasting President
Lincoln, referring to him as a political tyrant, and calling for his
overthrow.98 Specifically, Vallandigham was charged with having
proclaimed, among other things, that "the present war was a
wicked, cruel, and unnecessary war, one not waged for the
preservation of the Union, but for the purpose of crushing out
liberty and to erect a despotism; a war for the freedom of the
blacks and the enslavement of the whites."99
Although he was a United States citizen who would ordinarily
be tried for criminal offenses in the civilian court system,
Vallandigham was tried before a military tribunal a day after his
arrest. 100 Vallandigham, an attorney, objected that trial by a
military tribunal was unconstitutional, but his protestations to
the Lincoln administration fell on deaf ears. 101 The military
tribunal found the Ohio Copperhead 102 in violation of General
Orders No. 38 and ordered him imprisoned until the war's end. 103
Subsequent to this sentence, Vallandigham petitioned the United
States Circuit Court sitting in Cincinnati for a writ of habeas
corpus, which, perhaps much to Chief Justice Taney's dismay, was
denied. 104 In a final attempt, Vallandigham petitioned the United
98. POORE, supra note 97, at 208; REHNQUIST, supra note 58, at 65-66.
99. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 244 (1864).
100. Id.; see also Curtis, supra note 96, at 121.
101. Vallandigham, 68 U.S. at 246.
102. Copperheads were Northern Democrats who sided with the South
and opposed the Civil War. Republicans dubbed such war opponents
Copperheads because of the copper liberty-head coins they wore as badges. 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
MILITARY HISTORY 498-99 (David S. Heidler & Jeanne T. Heidler eds., 2000).
The term Copperhead was "borrowed from the poisonous snake of the same
name that lies in hiding and strikes without warning. However,
'Copperheads' regarded themselves as lovers of liberty, and some of them
wore a lapel pin with the head of the Goddess of Liberty cut out of the large
copper penny minted by the Federal treasury." Frank J. Williams, Abraham
Lincoln and Civil Liberties in Wartime, HERITAGE LECTURES 5 n.18 (May 5,
2004), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/
h1834.cfm.
103. THE TRIAL OF HON. CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM BY A MILITARY
COMMISSION AND THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER HIS APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 33 (Cincinnati, Rickey & Carroll 1863).
104. Id. at 37-39, 272.
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States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but his petition to
the Court was unsuccessful, the court ruling that it was without
jurisdiction to review the military tribunal's proceedings.105
Not surprisingly, the trial of Vallandigham by a military
tribunal subjected Lincoln to yet more criticism. His critics
bemoaned his decision, deeming it "a palpable violation of the...
Constitution."'106  Lincoln insisted, however, that civilians
captured away from the battlefield could lawfully be tried by a
military tribunal because the whole country, in his opinion, was a
war zone. 107 Lincoln further defended his suspension of habeas
corpus:
If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my
error lies in believing that certain proceedings are
constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or Invasion, the
public Safety requires them . . .The constitution itself
makes the distinction; and I can no more be persuaded
that the government can constitutionally take no strong
measure in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that
the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace,
than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good
medicine for a sick man, because it can be shown to not
be good food for a well one.108
President Lincoln, concerned about the harshness of
Vallandigham's punishment and the potential criticism over
Vallandigham's arrest, detention, and trial by military tribunal,
commuted his sentence to banishment to the Confederacy. 109
3. The Case of Lambdin P. Milligan
In 1866, the war having ended, the Supreme Court was called
upon to consider the legality of Lincoln's suspension of habeas
105. Vallandigham, 68 U.S. at 251.
106. See Annotation to Lincoln's Letter to Matthew Birch and Others, as
reprinted in 6 COLL. WORKS, supra note 87, at 300.
107. MCPHERSON, supra note 69, at 217.
108. To Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), as reprinted in 6
COLL. WORKS, supra note 87, at 267.
109. See Curtis, supra note 96, at 121. The Confederacy was not happy to
see Vallandigham, who made his way to Winsor, Ontario, opposite Ohio,
where he ran unsuccessfully for Governor of Ohio.
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corpus and his use of military tribunals.11 0 The Supreme Court,
upon which Taney no longer sat, as he had died in 1864, proceeded
to conclude, as Taney had in Merryman, that the President could
not unilaterally suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
On October 5, 1864, Lambdin P. Milligan, a lawyer and
Indiana citizen, had been arrested by the military commander for
that military district on the basis of his belief that Milligan was
plotting to overthrow the government.Il Although Milligan was
not captured on the battlefield, he was tried by a military
commission and sentenced to death even though the civilian
courts were functioning in Indiana.1 12 Before the sentence was
carried out, Milligan petitioned the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Indiana for a writ of habeas corpus.113
The Circuit Court certified the question to the Supreme Court,
which assumed jurisdiction and issued the writ. 1 14
In so concluding, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
suspension of habeas corpus was permissible, but that such a
suspension did not apply to Milligan's case because he had not
joined the Confederate forces and was captured away from the
battlefield in an area where civilian courts were still operating. 115
According to the Court, Milligan was simply a person who was
ideologically aligned with the Confederates and not an enemy
combatant who should be tried by a military tribunal. 116
Therefore, Milligan could only be properly tried in a civilian court
and not by a military tribunal.117 This post-war, post-Taney Court
also impliedly validated Chief Justice Taney's opinion in
Merryman as it agreed that only Congress may authorize the
suspension of habeas corpus. 118
Milligan did make clear, however, that the right of American
citizens to seek a writ of habeas corpus may be suspended during
wartime so long as those citizens have joined enemy forces or have
been captured on the battlefield. Indeed, without such a ruling,
110. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
111. THE MILLIGAN CASE 64 (Samuel Klaus, ed., Gaunt, Inc. 1997).
112. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 106-07.
113. Id. at 107-09.
114. Id. at 110-11.
115. Id. at 127, 131.
116. Id. at 131.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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"the Union could not have fought the Civil War, because the
courts would have ordered President Lincoln to release thousands
of Confederate POWs and spies."1 19
C. World War 11 Prompts Trials by Military Commission Without
Habeas Corpus Protections.
In accordance with the venerable maxim that "what's past is
prologue,"1 20 almost a century after its decision in the Milligan
case, the Supreme Court revisited the legality of trials by military
tribunal without habeas corpus protection in the context of a
different war.
This time it was President Franklin D. Roosevelt who was
faced with the momentous decision of to how to try detainees at
the height of World War 11.121 His order, denying enemy captives
access to the United States courts and authorizing trials by
military tribunals, resulted in the placement of Ex parte Quirin122
on the Supreme Court's docket; the Quirin case closely mirrored
the issues addressed in Milligan.
In June 1942, several months after Congress had declared
that a state of war existed between Germany and the United
States, eight German saboteurs, acting for the German Reich, a
belligerent enemy nation, boarded two submarines in occupied
France and traveled to Long Island, New York, and Ponte Vedra
Beach, Florida, respectively. 123 The German-born saboteurs were
engaged in a plot to destroy war facilities in the United States.1 24
Upon the eventual capture of the enemy agents, President
Roosevelt convened a secret military tribunal to try the eight men,
resulting in a guilty verdict and a death sentence for each. 125 The
prisoners petitioned the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus, which was
119. Yoo, supra note 29, at 146.
120. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1. Shakespeare's
words are inscribed on the National Archives Building on Pennsylvania
Avenue in Washington, D.C. See RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 245 (Suzy Platt, ed., 1993).
121. LouIs FISHER, NAzI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND
AMERICAN LAw 37-44 (2005).
122. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
123. Id. at 21.
124. Id. at 20-21.
125. Id. at 22; see also FISHER, supra note 121, at 43-44.
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denied. 126  The prisoners then petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari review of the district court's decision
and additionally petitioned the Supreme Court for leave to file
their petitions for habeas corpus in that Court as well. 127 The
Court of Appeals had not yet issued a decision when the prisoners
also petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. 128 Before a decision was issued by the Court
of Appeals, the prisoners again petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari, which the Court granted. 129
The Supreme Court, considered whether the detention of the
petitioners by the United States was consistent with the laws and
Constitution of the United States. 130 The Court explained that
"military tribunals.. . are not courts in the sense of the. Judiciary
Article [of the Constitution]."'13 1 Instead, the Court held that such
Article I tribunals are administrative bodies within the military
that are utilized to determine the guilt or innocence of "declared
enemies," and to subsequently pass judgment. 132
Upholding the jurisdiction of the military tribunals to hear
the cases of the German saboteurs, the Court emphatically stated:
The law of war draws a distinction between the armed
forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations
and also between those who are lawful and unlawful
combatants. -Lawful combatants are subject to capture
and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military
forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to
trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which
render their belligerency unlawful. 133
In so ruling, the Court went to great lengths to distinguish its
holding from that rendered years before in Milligan.134 The
Supreme Court emphasized that the holding in Milligan should be
126. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 19-20.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 24-25.
131. Id. at 39.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 30-31.
134. Id. at 29.
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limited to the facts of that case. As the Quirin Court noted,
Milligan was a citizen of Indiana and had never been a resident of
any state involved in the rebellion nor had he been an enemy
combatant who would qualify as a prisoner of war.135 Quirin,
however, involved "enemies who, with the purpose of destroying
war materials and utilities, entered, or after entry remained in,
our territory without uniform-an offense against the law of
war."136 Those critical distinctions allowed the Court to rule in the
government's favor. 137
Having resolved, in Quirin, the appropriateness of trying in
the United States unlawful enemy combatants by military
tribunal, the Court in 1950 next considered the related question of
whether alien prisoners seized overseas during wartime had the
right to petition the courts of the United States for a writ of
habeas corpus. 138
The case of Johnson v. Eisentrager139 involved one Ludwig
Eisentrager, who had operated a German intelligence office in
Shanghai and, with his cohorts, had contracted to aid the
Japanese during World War II in return for money and food.
140
The spies additionally agreed, inter alia, to intercept American
naval communications and transmit them to the Japanese
forces. 141
In 1946, the United States military captured Eisentrager and
twenty-six other foreign intelligence officers in China. 142 The
officers were tried and convicted by a United States military
commission and were then imprisoned in a German prison then
controlled by the United States Army. 143
Seeking to challenge their detention, Eisentrager and twenty
other German nationals petitioned the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus. 144
The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction,
135. Id.
136. Id. at 46.
137. Id. at 48.
138. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
139. Id.




144. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765.
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but the Court of Appeals subsequently reversed, reinstating the
petition for habeas corpus and remanding the case for further
proceedings.1 45
When the case finally reached the United States Supreme
Court on the government's petition for certiorari, the high court
agreed with the district court and held that the petitioners had no
right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' 46 Finding the
location of the prisoners' capture, conviction, and detention
dispositive, the Supreme Court noted: "These prisoners at no
relevant time were within any territory over which the United
States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture,
their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of any court of the United States.'1 47
It would be another half century before the past would become
prologue 148 yet again. In 2001 issues of the habeas corpus rights
of enemy combatants, markedly similar to those that arose during
the administrations of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt,
appeared once again on the Supreme Court's docket.
II. NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
"In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in
mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not
assail you. You can have no conflict, with being yourselves the
aggressors. You have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the
government, while I shall have the most solemn one to "preserve,
protect and defend' it.' 49
The events of September 11, 2001 were as inhumane as they
were unanticipated by most Americans and individuals
throughout the world. On that cloudless autumn morning,
nineteen Islamic terrorists hijacked four commercial jet airliners,
intentionally flying two of the planes into the twin towers of New
York City's World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon in
145. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
146. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 791.
147. Id. at 778.
148. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 120, at act 2, sc. 1.
149. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), as
reprinted in 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 271.
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Arlington, Virginia. 150 The fourth plane, believed to have been
aimed at a governmental target in Washington, D.C., crashed in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania when its passengers attempted to
retake control of the plane to avert further mass murder. 15 1 In
one morning, almost 3,000 innocent civilians perished on
American soil as victims of horrific depredations committed by
nihilistic barbarians. 152
During the days and months following these savage terrorist
attacks, Americans demanded improved homeland security.
153
Homeland security alerts, flashing colors ranging from red and
orange to yellow and green scrolled across television sets,
computer screens, and electronic airport billboards nationwide,
reminding Americans that the nation's security was at risk. 154
President Bush, aware of his solemn duty to take action to
defend and protect the United States, responded. 155 As a nation,
we responded with a War on Terror in the hope that it would serve
150. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTAcKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 1-4, 7, 8, 10
(2004).
151. Id. at 14.
152. See September 11, 2001 Victim's List at http://www.septemberll
victims.com (last visited Aug. 3, 2007).
153. See, e.g., Editorial, A higher price for airline safety; President's plan:
Restoring faith, travel, economy requires basic adjustments in expectations,
THE BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 28, 2001, at 22A; Jeff Donaldson, Bono fields
student questions, THE DESERT SUN, Sept. 28, 2001, at 1B; Laureen Fagan,
Crisis pits protection against liberty, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Oct. 7, 2001, at Al
(reporting on a post-September 11, 2001 survey titled "Personal Freedom vs.
National Security" by Business Week Online indicating that Americans are
more willing to sacrifice civil liberties during wartime); Editorial, Fear of
Flying, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 28, 2001; Jay Winik, Security
Comes Before Liberty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2001, at A26.
154. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (Mar. 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-5.h
tml (establishing a system structured to alert Americans to threat levels and
protective measures).
155. George W. Bush, Radio Address (Sept. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html ("We are
planning a broad and sustained campaign to secure our country and
eradicate the evil of terrorism."); see also George W. Bush, Radio Address
(Dec. 17, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/12/20051217.html ("The American people expect me to do everything in
my power under our laws and Constitution to protect them and their civil
liberties. And that is exactly what I will continue to do, so long as I'm the
President of the United States.").
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to secure our borders.156
The President's critics wasted no time in declaring that
September 11th did not constitute the commencement of a war. 157
They argued that President Bush generalized the War on Terror,
likening it to the so-called war on drugs, war on poverty, gang
wars, or war of the sexes. 158 Nevertheless, the President, the
Congress, and the terrorists have made it abundantly clear that
we are a nation at war. 159
Three days after the attacks that compromised our nation's
security, President Bush declared a national emergency 160 to
which Congress, in agreement, responded by enacting an
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) on September 18,
2001.161 The AUMF empowered the President to "take action and
prevent acts of international terrorism against the United
States."' 62  It further authorized the President to "use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the .terrorist attacks."'6 3  Congress's
authorization was, in all respects, a ratification of the President's
156. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
157. See, e.g., Bush Says it's Time for Action, CNN, available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/ret.bush.coalition/index.html (last
visited Aug. 5, 2007). This criticism continues today. See, e.g., BRUCE
ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE
OF TERRORISM 13 (2006) (describing the War on Terror as a "preposterous
expression."); Samantha Power, Our War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July.29,
2007, at § 7 (Book Review), at 8 (describing the War on Terror as
metaphorical).
158. See, e.g., Todd Richardson, "War on Terror" difficult to define,
BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 2, 2004, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/nationworld/2002023596_russana102.html (the War on Terror has been
deemed analogous to the War on Drugs because the 'enemy' is
unascertainable and terrorism, like drugs, will not likely end as a result of a
war).
159. See Yoo, supra note 29, at 11.
160. George W. Bush, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of
Certain Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/09/20010914-4.html.




STILL A FRIGHTENING UNKNOWN
actions as Commander-in-Chief and checkmated any potential
criticism he might have otherwise been subjected to (as was
President Lincoln) for acting unilaterally. 16 4 Further confirming
the existence of a state of war, approximately two months later
the President issued an order permitting the establishment of
military commissions to detain and prosecute suspected
terrorists. 165 The effect of that order was to convene the first
United States military commission in over fifty years. 166
President Bush emphasized that trial by military commission was
necessary "in light of grave acts of terrorism and threats of
terrorism ... to protect the United States and its citizens." 167 His
order made it clear that it was not practical for such tribunals to
apply without modifying the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
federal courts. 168
The President's order establishing military commissions was
suspect in the eyes of some legal commentators. 169 The American
Bar Association (ABA) convened a task force on terrorism and the
law, which eventually issued a report and recommendation. 170
Although the ABA conceded that the President's order did "not
expressly suspend[] the writ of habeas corpus," fearing that the
order might be interpreted as having done so, the ABA took the
164. CUTLER, supra note 95, at 23.
165. Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001)
[hereinafter Military Order of Nov. 16, 2001]. Military tribunals are
constitutionally and statutorily authorized special courts composed of
military personnel and/or civilians who are commissioned to sit as both trier
of fact and of the law. In such proceedings, any evidence deemed to have
probative value will be admitted.
166. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Defense Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, No. 820-04, First Military Commission
convened at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba (Aug. 24, 2001), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7667.
167. Military Order of Nov. 16, 2001, supra note 165.
168. For specific examples of the difficulties inherent in trying unlawful
enemy combatants in the civilian criminal justice system, see infra Part VI.A.
169. See Alberto R. Gonzales, Op-Ed, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (noting that "[s]ome in Congress and some civil
libertarians remain skeptical of the military commissions").
170. American Bar Association, Task Force on Terrorism and the Law,
Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, Jan. 4, 2002, at 1,
available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf.
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position that, even if the President desired to suspend the writ, "it
is most unlikely that [he] could. 171 In its recommendation, the
ABA urged the government to afford habeas corpus relief in the
federal courts for those tried by military commission in the United
States. 172
Against this backdrop, detainees held captive by the United
States in Guantfinamo Bay, Cuba petitioned the federal courts for
habeas corpus relief.
III. DETAINEES SEEK IMMEDIATE RELIEF FROM THE JUDICIARY
A. The Trilogy: Padilla, Rasul, and Hamdi.
June 2004 marked a turning point for those detained in
Guantdnamo as the United States Supreme Court, in a trilogy of
cases, spelled out what was required of the United States
government in its efforts to properly achieve'the necessary
constitutional balance between civil liberties and national
security. Some discussion of these cases is necessary.
1. Rumsfeld v. Padilla 173
On May 8, 2002, acting pursuant to a previously issued arrest
warrant, federal law enforcement agents arrested Jose Padilla, a
United States citizen, at O'Hare International Airport in
Chicago. 174 Padilla was considered to be a material witness with
respect to the September 11, 2001 attacks, and he was also
believed to have been engaged in plotting to plant a radiological
dispersal device 175 in the United States. 176 Within one month of
his arrest, Padilla was designated an enemy combatant who posed
a grave threat to national security. 177 Accordingly, he was placed
171. Id. at 11.
172. Id. at 17.
173. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
174. Id. at 430-31.
175. A radiological dispersal device is terminology often used to refer to a
"dirty bomb." Argonne National Laboratory, Human Health Fact Sheet (Aug.
2005), available at http://www.ead.anl.gov/pub/doc/rdd.pdf.
176. See William Glaberson, Judges Question Detention of American, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, at A19.
177. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430; see also James Risen & Philip Shenon,
Traces of Terror: The Investigation; U.S. Says it Halted Qaeda Plot to use
Radioactive Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at Al.
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in the custody of the Department of Defense, and he was held in a
United States Navy brig in Charleston, South Carolina. 17 8 Padilla
immediately petitioned the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York for habeas corpus relief pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
In denying Padilla's petition, the district court held that the
President of the United States was authorized to designate and
detain an American citizen captured on American soil as an
"enemy combatant."1 79 Padilla could, therefore, challenge any
subsequent conviction by way of appeal.
Dissatisfied, Padilla appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which disagreed with the district
court's ruling. 180 The Second Circuit ruled that the executive
branch could not detain American citizens in military detention
facilities without congressional authorization. 18 1 Ultimately, the
court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
grant the writ of habeas corpus and direct the Secretary of
Defense to release Padilla within thirty days unless criminal
charges were brought against him or unless he was held as a
material witness in connection with grand jury proceedings.18 2
The case reached the United States Supreme Court on the
government's appeal. It was believed that the Court would
address the issue of whether an American citizen captured within
the United States could be denied access to the American court
system.
To Padilla's disappointment, however, the Court did not
decide that issue. Rather, in a 5 to 4 decision, the Court ruled on
jurisdictional grounds and held that Padilla's habeas corpus
petition had been improperly filed.' 8 3 Because Padilla was held at
the Navy brig in Charleston, South Carolina, the habeas petition
was faulty because it should have been filed in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina. 184 Moreover, the
petition should have named as the defendant the Navy facility's
178. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 432.
179. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
180. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004).
184. Id.
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commander, not the Secretary of Defense. 8 5 Accordingly, the
Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision and remanded the
case so that it could be dismissed without prejudice. 186
Padilla promptly filed a new petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, this time appropriately invoking the jurisdiction of the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.' 8 7
Agreeing with the petitioner, the district court ruled that the
President lacked the authority to detain Padilla and that
therefore, his detention was in violation of the Constitution.188
The district court ordered that the government either bring
federal criminal charges against Padilla or release him. 8 9
However, when the case reached the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on the government's appeal, that
appellate court reversed the district court's ruling and held that
the AUMF authorized Padilla's detention without prosecution for
the duration of hostilities. 190 Padilla then petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari.1 91 While this petition was pending,
however, the government indicted Padilla, 192 and in late 2005 the
Bush administration filed a motion in the Fourth Circuit seeking
the court's approval of Padilla's transfer from military custody in
Charleston to the custody of a federal detention center in Miami,
Florida. 193 Concerned that, if the appellate court were to approve
the transfer, the Supreme Court's consideration of Padilla's
pending petition for certiorari would be affected, the Fourth
Circuit deferred consideration of the issue and denied the request.
The court concluded that the Supreme Court ought to decide the
185. Id. at 442. The Court so ruled because the facility commander was
Padilla's immediate custodian. Secretary Rumsfeld, therefore, was
improperly named as a defendant in the original filing.
186. Id. at 451.
187. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 391, 397.
191. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
192. See Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006).
193. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2005) (mem.). The
government's motion was made pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 36, which
authorizes the transfer of a prisoner in a habeas corpus proceeding only upon
the authorization of the court or judge who entered the decision under
review.
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case. 194
Dissatisfied with the Fourth Circuit's ruling, the Bush
administration petitioned the Supreme Court for the same
authorization. 195 On January 4, 2006, the Supreme Court ordered
Padilla's transfer from Charleston to Miami, this time to face
criminal conspiracy charges in civilian court.1 96 After slightly
more than a day of deliberations, on August 16, 2007, a federal
jury found Padilla guilty of terrorism conspiracy charges. 197
Padilla now faces life imprisonment. 198
2. Rasul v. Bush
In a decision rendered the same day as the Padilla decision,
the Supreme Court was called upon to answer a single question:
"whether the habeas corpus statute' 99 confers a right to judicial
review of the legality of Executive detention of aliens [at
Guantdnamo]. ' '200 By contrast with what it did in the Padilla
case, the Supreme Court reached the merits of the case, answering
the question in the affirmative. 201
Under American law, detained individuals seeking habeas
194. Id. at 583-84.
195. Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S. Ct. 978 (2006).
196. Id.; see also Terry Aguayo, Padilla Pleads Not Guilty; Bail is Denied,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A14.
197. Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla is Guilty on All Charges in
Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at Al. Some commentators suspect
that critics of the Military Commission system will point to the Padilla
verdict in support of their position that the civilian criminal justice system is
suitable to try detainees during the War on Terror. However, as the editorial
staff of the Wall Street Journal was quick to note, the Padilla verdict is "not a
model for the future handling of enemy combatants." Editorial, The Padilla
Verdict, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2007, at A12. As discussed further infra, it
would be unrealistic to try alien enemy combatants in the civilian criminal
justice system. See infra Part VI.A. While it is easy to require law
enforcement agents to afford protections required of our criminal justice
system such as Miranda warnings when arresting citizens in a local airport,
for example it would be wholly unrealistic to expect that such protections
could be afforded to alien enemy combatants arrested in a desert in the
Middle East. The Padilla Verdict, supra. Failing to afford such protections
would result in defendants tried in the civilian criminal justice system being
set free. Id.
198. Goodnough, supra note 197.
199. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c3) (2000).
200. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004).
201. Id. at 484.
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corpus relief must first invoke the court's jurisdiction by
establishing either they are citizens of the United States or the
Court has jurisdiction over such a petition. 20 2  Because the
detainees in Rasul v. Bush were not, in fact, citizens, the issue
was narrowed to whether there was federal court jurisdiction over
the Guantinamo Bay facility. 203
Relying on Johnson v. Eisentrager,2 04 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that no court in
the United States has jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed by
aliens detained outside the United States.205 On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, the district court's ruling was affirmed, 20 with the
appellate court also relying on Eisentrager.
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the
government again urged that Eisentrager controlled.2 07 As further
support for its position, the government had cited the treaty
between the United States and Cuba regarding Guantfinamo
Bay.208 Pointing to that portion of the treaty specifying that the
United States maintains "complete jurisdiction" while Cuba has
"ultimate sovereignty, '209 the government argued that habeas
corpus would not be available because no federal court would have
jurisdiction over such a petition. 210 For their part, however, the
detainees pointed to the government's concession that, if the
prisoners were being held in the United States, the federal courts
would be open to them.211 According to the detainees, there was
"no persuasive reason why an area subject to the complete,
exclusive, and indefinite jurisdiction and control of the United
States, where this country alone has wielded power for more than
a century, should be treated the same as occupied enemy territory,
202. Id.
203. Id. at 475.
204. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
205. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 66 (D.D.C. 2002).
206. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
207. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475.
208. Id.
209. See Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of
Lands for Coaling and Naval stations, Feb. 23, 1903, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb /avalon/diplomacy/cuba/cuba002.htm.
210. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475.
211. Brief of Petitioners at 41, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-
334).
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temporarily controlled as an incident of wartime operations. '2 12
In its 6-3 decision, the majority quickly rejected the
government's contentions, noting the difference between those
detained in Guantdnamo and the Eisentrager detainees. 2 13 The
Court explained:
[The detainees in Rasul] are not nationals of countries at
war with the United States, and they deny that they have
engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the
United States; they have never been afforded access to
any tribunal, much less charged with or convicted of
wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have been
imprisoned in territory over which the United States
exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control. 21 4
Writing for the majority, Associate Justice John Paul Stevens
opined that a detainee need not be within the territorial
jurisdiction of a district court for the court to have jurisdiction
pursuant to the habeas statute.2 15 Citing Milligan and Quirin,
the Court noted that federal courts have, in fact, reviewed
applications for habeas relief during wartime. 21 6  The Court
recalled that in Milligan it entertained the habeas petition of an
American who plotted to attack military installations during the
Civil War, and in Quirin, the petition of self-proclaimed enemy
combatants who were convicted of war crimes and detained in the
United States during World War 11.217
Holding that the district court did, in fact, have jurisdiction
over such challenges made by detainees with respect to their
indefinite detention in a facility under the control of the United
States,2 18 the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district
court.
2 19
In a vehement dissent, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Associate Justice Thomas joined, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia
212. Id. at 41-42.
213. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476 (Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment
but not in Justice Stevens' opinion).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 478-79.
216. Id. at 474-75.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 483.
219. Id. at 485.
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described the majority's opinion as "a wrenching departure from
precedent. '220 According to Justice Scalia, the majority impliedly
overruled Eisentrager and ignored the plain language of the
habeas statute, which requires that at least one federal district
court have territorial jurisdiction over detainees.221  Because
Guantdnamo detainees are not located within the territorial
jurisdiction of any federal district court, Justice Scalia concluded
that jurisdiction pursuant to the habeas statute was improper. 222
3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
A third case heard by the Supreme Court in April of 2004
involved Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan in 2001.223 Because Hamdi was
captured overseas in a combat zone, the case presented a far
different issue from that in Padilla,224 and his status as a United
States citizen distinguished the issues in his case from those
before the Court in Rasul.
Although Hamdi was born in Louisiana, he moved with his
family when he was a young child to Saudi Arabia. 225  He
eventually affiliated with the Taliban and was captured when his
unit surrendered to the Northern Alliance forces during a battle in
Afghanistan. 226
After Hamdi's capture he was first detained in Afghanistan
and was later transferred to the United States Naval Base at
Guantdinamo Bay, where he remained for four months. 227 Upon
learning that Hamdi was an American citizen, the government
transferred him to a Navy brig in Norfolk; Virginia and then to a
similar brig in Charleston, South Carolina. 228 The government
designated him an "illegal enemy combatant" on the basis of its
belief that he had been aiding the Taliban in combat against
220. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 505 n.5.
222. Id.
223. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
224. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson,
J., concurring) ("To compare this battlefield capture to the domestic arrest in
Padilla v. Bush is to compare apples and oranges.").
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American forces in Afghanistan. 229 Hamdi's detention prompted
his father to petition the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia for a writ of habeas corpus.230
Before the district court, Hamdi argued that, as an American
citizen, he was entitled to the full panoply of constitutional
protections, including the right to petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. 231 The United States government, not convinced, moved
to dismiss Hamdi's petition.232 In support of its motion, the
government attached the affidavit of Michael Mobbs, Special
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 233 Mobbs
attested to the fact that Hamdi had been captured in Afghanistan
during armed hostilities and that a series of American military
screening procedures had determined that he met the criteria for
determining that he was an unlawful enemy combatant. 234
However informative the Mobbs affidavit may have been, the
district court believed that it fell short of containing enough
information to justify Hamdi's detention. 235 Not surprisingly, the
government sought interlocutory review of the district court's
ruling in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. 236 When the case reached that court, the panel expressly
indicated that deference, in the conduct of war, should be afforded
to the President. It stated: "The judiciary is not at liberty to
eviscerate detention interests directly derived from the war
powers of Articles I and 11. ' '237 The court upheld the President's
authority to detain a United States citizen captured on the
battlefield and his authority to designate such an individual an
unlawful enemy combatant.238
The case reached the United States Supreme Court 239 and in
229. Id. at 510-11.
230. Id. at 511.
231. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 6, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No.
2:02cv439 (E.D. Va. 2002), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.find
law.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums6llO2pet.pdf.
232. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 601 (4th Cir. 2002).
233. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 2003).
234. Id. at 461-62.
235. Id. at 462.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 466.
238. Id. at 474-75.
239. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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stark contrast to the Fourth Circuit's opinion, eight of the nine
justices 240 rejected the government's position that great deference
should be afforded to presidential decisions regarding national
security. 24 1 Writing for the plurality,24 2 Associate Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor explained that "[w]e have long since made clear
that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it
comes to the rights of the nation's citizens. '243
The plurality decision in Hamdi is illustrative of the concept
of separation of powers that is so deeply rooted in the American
system of government. Most notable is the judiciary's ability to
review actions of the executive branch that allegedly have
infringed upon a citizen's constitutional rights. According to the
Court, such judicial review is available, even in times of national
emergency. The Court's decision in Hamdi maintains individual
civil liberties while simultaneously divesting the White House of
its power to limit the rights of United States citizens who had
been designated unlawful enemy combatants during a national
emergency. 244
The plurality of the Court in Hamdi was also greatly
concerned that detaining individuals indefinitely would deprive
such persons of their due process rights. Although cognizant of
the consideration that national security interests militate in favor
of more lenient procedural rules, the Court nonetheless opined
that the government had failed to achieve the appropriate
constitutional balance. 245 The Court reasoned that "the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of a detainee's liberty is unacceptably high
under the Government's proposed rule. '246 Justice O'Connor's
opinion mandated that citizen-detainees receive notice of the
government's factual basis for their classification as enemy
combatants and a fair opportunity to rebut that assertion before a
neutral decision maker. 247 Expressing the Hamdi plurality's due
240. Justice Clarence Thomas was the only justice to side entirely with
the government.
241. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-36.
242. The plurality consisted of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist,
and Breyer.
243. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 532.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 533.
STILL A FRIGHTENING UNKNOWN
process concerns, Justice O'Connor wrote: "An interrogation by
one's captor, however effective an intelligence-gathering tool,
hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate fact-finding before a
neutral decision-maker. '248 Furthermore, the plurality indicated
that Hamdi "unquestionably has the right of access to counsel in
connection with the proceedings on remand. '249
According to the plurality, "it is during our most challenging
and uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to due
process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for
which we fight abroad. '250 The plurality perceived irony in the
denial by the United States of personal liberties at home while
simultaneously fighting for such liberties abroad.2 5 1
The plurality's decision officially repudiated the United States
government's suspension of certain of Hamdi's individual
liberties 252 because due process should afford him a meaningful
opportunity to contest his detention before a neutral decision
maker.
Nonetheless, the government had reason to be pleased with
another aspect of the Hamdi decision. Five members of the court
agreed that citizens of the United States could be held as enemy
combatants, 253 and four of them also believed that the President
had the authority to designate specific persons as enemy
combatants. 254
Justices Scalia and Stevens, dissented, maintaining that
Hamdi was entitled to habeas corpus relief "unless (1) criminal
proceedings are promptly brought, or (2) Congress has suspended
the writ of habeas corpus. '255 Although conceding that Hamdi's
case was not an easy one in light of the competing demands of
national security and the rights of citizens to personal liberties,
248. Id. at 538.
249. Id. at 539.
250. Id. at 532.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. The members of the court who were of that opinion were Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer.
254. The members of the court who were of that opinion were Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer.
255. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 573.
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the two justices tilted towards the side of personal liberty.256
However, whatever hope remained for the Bush
administration's policies in the wake of Hamdi, was eviscerated by
a decision of the Supreme Court two years later.
B. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
In what was described by one journalist as "the most
significant setback yet for the administration's broad expansions
of presidential power,"257 the United States Supreme Court in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 258 ruled that President Bush's first attempt
at establishing military commissions violated both the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the four Geneva Conventions
signed in 1946;259 As such, the high court struck down the
military commissions, leaving Congress and the President to
reconsider their approach to this gathering storm.26 0
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, who was
originally charged with conspiracy to commit "offenses triable by
military commission," had petitioned the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia Circuit for a writ of habeas
corpus in response to his impending military commission trial.261
The district court granted Hamdan's petition262 and in November
of 2004 it barred the military commission from trying Hamdan
because, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva 111)263 mandates that
those tried by military commission must first be designated a
prisoner of war, and a "competent tribunal" had not yet
256. Id. at 554.
257. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at Al. But see James Taranto, Op-Ed,
The Truth About Guantanamo, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2007 (labeling some of
Greenhouse's coverage of the Hamdan decision as "purple prose"). Taranto
notes that "journalists have falsely portrayed Guantanamo as an affront to
the Constitution and international law." Specifically, he points to the New
York Times's coverage of Hamdan, which he believes rather dramatically
overplayed the significance of the Supreme Court's decision. Id.
258. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
259. Id.
260. See id.
261. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004) (mem.).
262. Id. at 173.
263. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S. 135.
STILL A FRIGHTENING UNKNJOWN
determined whether Hamdan fit this criterion.264 The district
court also ruled that the military commission that sought to try
Hamdan was formed in violation of the UCMJ.265 Setting out the
precise requirements, the district court explained that, before a
prisoner may be tried by a military tribunal, there must first be a
hearing in order to determine whether the terms of the Geneva
Convention apply.2 66 If they do apply, the defendant is entitled to
have his case heard under the UCMJ and would receive the same
procedural safeguards as any member of the American armed
forces. 26 7 The Bush administration appealed. 2 68
In July of 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, granted a victory, although
temporary, for the government and overturned the lower court's
decision.269 The Circuit Court panel stated unequivocally that the
Geneva Convention does not apply to members of the al Qaeda
terrorist network. 270
Responding to the Circuit Court's decision, the military
commission prepared to try Hamdan, but its efforts were again
thwarted when the United States Supreme Court agreed to review
the Circuit Court decision.271  Chief Justice Roberts' earlier
involvement in the case resulted in his recusal at the Supreme
Court level.272 In a blow to the Bush administration, the Court
rendered a 5-3 decision, holding that the military commissions, as
then structured, violated the UCMJ and the Geneva
Convention.273 In the end, the Court did not take issue with the
existence of the military tribunals per se, but rather focused its
concern on the procedural means employed to convene them. 274
264. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
265. Id. at 165-66.
266. Id. at 161-62.
267. Id. at 160.
268. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.:3d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
269. Id. at 44.
270. Id. at 40. The present Chief Justice John Roberts, at that time a
judge on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, was one of
those who ruled in favor of the government's position.
271. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622, 622 (2006).
272. Id.
273. Editorial, No Blank Check for Bush, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 2006, at
A16.
274. Review & Outlook: Affirming Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Feb.
20, 2007, at A14.
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Four members of the Court explicitly advised the President to
reconsider his strategy and to seek authorization from
Congress.275 "Nothing prevents the President from returning to
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary," Justice
Breyer noted in his concurring opinion, which was joined by
Associate Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg.276
Beyond their suggestion to the President, these four justices
also made clear that Congress had authority to revisit the issue
and to ultimately grant the President the power to convene such
tribunals.277 Justice Kennedy stated: "[A]s presently structured,
Hamdan's military commission exceeds the bounds Congress has
placed on the President's authority. . . .Because Congress has
prescribed these limits, Congress can change them. '278
Currently, Hamdan remains in custody and, in light of
Congress's subsequent passage of the Military Commissions Act of
2006,279 he is awaiting trial by military commission.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
While the judiciary diligently worked to articulate its
understanding of the rule of law, across the street members of
Congress sought to comply with the Supreme Court's rulings. The
fruit of their efforts was the passage of two acts, both designed to
establish the ground rules for prosecuting suspected terrorists in
both charted and uncharted legal territory.
A. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
An early amendment to a defense authorization bill, approved
by the Senate on November 10, 2005, sought to deprive alien
enemy combatants of access to the federal courts altogether.28 0
However, within days of that bill's approval, Senators Lindsey 0.
275. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2808 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's
concurrence.
276. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
277. Id. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
278. Id.
279. See infra section IV.B.
280. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 151 CONG.
REC. S12666 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005).
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Graham (R-S.C.) and Carl Levin (D-Mich.) sponsored a substitute
amendment to narrow the bill's breadth.28' The Graham-Levin
Amendment, approved by the Senate, authorized an appeal to the
courts by a person designated as an "enemy combatant" or
convicted by a military commission at Guantinamo after the
military trial and appeal were concluded. 28 2
On December 30, 2005, President Bush signed into law the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,283 which included the Graham-
Levin Amendment. If there was any doubt as to the procedural
safeguards afforded to Guant~namo detainees, the Detainee
Treatment Act helped ease such apprehension. The act provided
detainees a means of access to the United States federal court
system, namely, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, to ensure that any final decision by
the military commission and appeal therefrom to the then
Military Review Panel were consistent with the military order and
the United States Constitution.28 4
Having resolved one problem, Congress, at the President's
urging, addressed another.
B. The Military Commissions Act of 2006
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan prompted President
Bush and his administration to revisit their strategy. The Court's
decision demonstrated that the government's first attempt at
achieving the proper constitutional balance between national
security and civil liberties had floundered, 28 5 but its second
attempt remains successful to date.28 6
Moments before signing into law the United States Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), President Bush explained that
his original attempt at establishing a system of military
commissions for the trial of alien detainees failed when the
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. DTA, supra note 16.
284. Id.
285. See Greenhouse, supra note 257.
286. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 1478 (2007), cert. granted, Boumediene v. Bush, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S.
June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195) (upholding the constitutionality of the Military
Commissions Act).
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Supreme Court held that military commissions needed to be
expressly authorized by Congress. 287
This time, with Congress's authorization, President Bush
signed into law the MCA on October 17, 2006;288 the stated
purpose of the act was to bring "to justice terrorists and other
unlawful enemy combatants through full and fair trials by
military commissions ... *"289
The primary effect of this new legislation was to establish the
jurisdiction of military tribunals. Specifically, by way of a section
titled "Habeas Corpus Matters," the act abrogates federal court
jurisdiction with respect to petitions for writs of habeas corpus
filed by or on behalf of alien unlawful enemy combatants detained
anywhere by the United States.290 The section, in relevant part,
provides:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States
who has been determined by the United States to have
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination. 29 1
Maintaining our nation's commitment to Geneva 11, the MCA
accentuates the importance of a just system to prosecute
suspected terrorists.292 Accordingly, the act confers jurisdiction on
military commissions that "extends solely to aliens who have
engaged in hostilities against the United States or who have
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against us. '293
Importantly, the act affords such alien enemy combatants a
full panoply of protections. Specifically, the act first authorizes a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal
287. George W. Bush, Speech, President Bush Signs Military Commission
Act of 2006, (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006 /10/20061017-1.html.
288. MCA, supra note 6.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at § 7(a).
292. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners- of War,
Part I, art. III, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S. 135. The MCA, in
effect, affords greater protections than those mandated by Geneva III. See
infra note 326 and accompanying text.
293. See MCA, supra note 6, at § 948(d).
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established under the authority of either the President of the
United States as Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of Defense,
to designate unlawful enemy combatants. 294
Charges against those individuals fall within the jurisdiction
of military commissions, special trial-level courts established to
hear those cases involving offenses punishable under the act or
the laws of war.295 This second stage consists of procedures that
are more protective of detainees' rights than was the case with
any military commissions in American history.296
Equally as important, the act provides for a Court of Military
Commission Review, a special appellate-level court, with a three-
member panel to review the decision of the commission. 297
As a third-level check, the act confirms the Detainee
Treatment Act's authorization of an appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 298
notwithstanding that the act otherwise eliminates federal court
jurisdiction over alien detainee petitions for habeas corpus.
Finally, in addition to the foregoing, the act confers a fourth
level of review, authorizing the United States Supreme Court's
review, by certiorari, of the federal circuit court's decision.299
Admittedly, the MCA precludes alien detainees from seeking
immediate review of their detention, but it does so by exchanging
that opportunity for protections that include four separate levels
of judicial review. By so doing, Congress and the President have
argued that they have created an acceptable constitutional
balance between civil liberties and national security.
V. LIFE AFTER THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT
The passage by Congress of the Military Commissions Act
increased debate over the level of protections that ought to be
afforded to alien unlawful enemy combatants detained during the
War on Terror. For those who believed that Hamdan settled the
294. See id. at § 948a.
295. See id. at § 948b.
296. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Op-Ed, Opposing View, Leave
well enough alone; Existing laws give Guantanamo detainees all the rights
they need, U.S.A. TODAY, May 11, 2007, at 14A.
297. See MCA, supra note 6, at § 950(f).
298. See id. at § 950g.
299. See id. at § 950g(d).
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matter, the MCA's passage was a significant setback. Both the
executive and legislative branches were sharply criticized by some
for their role in declining to afford alien detainees one of the rights
enjoyed by American citizens-the right to immediately petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. 300 The New York Times posited that
"[tihe Military Commissions Act of 2006 makes it virtually
impossible to contest a status tribunal's decision, '301 and it urged
Congress to rewrite the act, cautioning that "[r]ewriting the act
should start with one simple step: restoring to prisoners of the war
on terror the fundamental right to challenge their detention in a
real court. '302 Such a statement demonstrates that the editorial
board of the Times failed to comprehend the provisions of the
Military Commissions Act and the protections it affords. The fact
is that the act does not abrogate the right of alien detainees
ultimately to appeal their conviction to an Article III court.
Undermining the argument made by the Times was its failure to
mention the four levels of review afforded to alien unlawful enemy
combatants under the act.
Plainly, the act affords detainees a right to challenge their
detention, even though it provides for a delay before that right can
be exercised in an Article III court. In response to criticism,
proponents of the act emphasized that it was a myth to believe
that under the bill "detainees would lose the basic right to
challenge their imprisonment. '303 Rather, Senators John W.
Warner Jr. (R-Va.), John McCain (R-Az.) and Lindsey 0. Graham
(R-S.C.) have sought to raise awareness that, "both the Detainee
Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act allow an
300. See, e.g., Editorial, Guilty Until Confirmed Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2006, § 4, at 11; Alberto J. Mora & Thomas R. Pickering, Op-Ed, Extend
Legal Rights to Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2007, at B7; Editorial, The
Must-Do List, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, § 4, at 11.
301. Guilty Until Confirmed Guilty, supra note 300.
302. Editorial, The Democrats' Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A26.
See also Editorial, Gitmo: A National Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2007, at
A22 (again failing to recognize that the MCA provides detainees with a
means of challenging their detention); Jonathan Hafetz, Op-Ed, Perils of an
unchecked executive, PROVIDENCE J., May 8, 2007, at B5 (also erroneously
stating that the Military Commissions Act "prevents federal courts from
enforcing [longstanding] rules [against illegal detention] by eliminating
habeas corpus").
303. John W. Warner et al., Look Past the Tortured Distortions, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 2, 2006, at A10.
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individual to challenge his status in administrative and judicial
fora."304
Despite these added protections, Senator Arlen Specter (R-
Pa.) maintained that the provision of the act which eliminates the
immediate right of detainees to seek habeas corpus was
unconstitutional. 305 Senator Specter voted for the bill, believing
some of its provisions were beneficial, but hoped that the courts
would clean up the act by striking the habeas corpus provision.306
However, a 2007 Court of Appeals decision upheld the act's
constitutionality. 30 7
A. Boumediene v. Bush
On February 20, 2007, a three-member panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
in a 2-1 decision, that the Military Commissions Act forecloses
aliens detained at Guantinamo from seeking habeas corpus
relief.308 The decision was the first to uphold the constitutionality
of a central tenet of the MCA since its passage in October 2006.
Not only was this a significant victory for the Bush
administration, but the decision also heralded a new era for
national security.
The issue before the Boumediene court was whether federal
courts have jurisdiction over petitions for writs of habeas corpus
filed by aliens captured abroad and detained'as unlawful enemy
combatants at Guantdnamo. 309
The detainees argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
Rasul settled the question and conferred on alien detainees a right
to seek a writ of habeas corpus. 310 The government, however,
304. Id.
305. See Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves
Detainee Bill Backed by Bush: Constitutional Challenges Predicted, WASH.
POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at Al.
306. Id.
307. Editorial, A Congressional Duty: Legislators should not expect courts
to undo the lawmakers' error of depriving foreign detainees of a fundamental
right, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2007, at A18.
308. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1478 (2007), cert. granted, Boumediene v. Bush, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June
29, 2007) (No. 06-1195).
309. Id. at 984.
310. Corrected Joint Brief for Appellants, at 10-11, Boumediene v. Bush,
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urged the court to recognize that Rasul was decided strictly on the
basis of the habeas corpus statute then in place.311 According to
the government, the Constitution does not afford alien detainees a
right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, nor would such a right
have been available at common law. Therefore, Congress could
decide whether to afford such a right to those presently detained
at Guant~namo. 312 By enacting the MCA, Congress made clear
that it would not afford such a right to detainees. Ultimately, the
government hoped that the court would conclude that federal
courts do not have jurisdiction over such petitions, thereby
validating that provision of the Military Commissions Act which
denies federal courts jurisdiction to review the detention of foreign
nationals.
The majority opinion, authored by Judge A. Raymond
Randolph, 313 immediately recognized that recent changes in the
law sharply distinguished the Rasul decision from the issue before
the court.314 The majority explained that Rasul was decided
pursuant to the habeas corpus statute then in effect, which was
first altered by the passage of the DTA and then again by the
passage of the MCA.3 15
476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-5062 & 05-5063).
311. Brief for the Federal Government Appellees, at 21-24, Boumediene v.
Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-5062 & 05-5063).
312. Reply/Cross-Appellee Brief for the United States, at 12-13,
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-5062 & 05-5063).
313. Judge David B. Sentelle concurred in Judge Randolph's majority
opinion.
314. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 984-86.
315. The MCA reads:
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained as
an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in [section 1005(e)(2) and (e)(3) of the DTA],
no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider
any other action against the United States or its agents relating to
any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions
of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United
States and has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.
MCA, supra note 6, at § 7(a).
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Judge Randolph began with the Supreme Court's proposition
in INS v. St. Cyr,3 16 that the Suspension Clause should be
interpreted, at minimum, to protect the writ of habeas corpus, as
it existed in 1789 when the first Judiciary Act established the
federal court system and conferred upon the courts jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus. 3 17  Accordingly, his opinion
navigated the history of the Great Writ, tracing it back to its
origins in medieval England and finding it compelling that, at that
time, the writ of habeas corpus extended only to the King's
dominions. 318  Furthermore, according to the court, its
examination of history revealed that the privilege of habeas
corpus would not have been available to aliens at the time of the
passage of the first Judiciary Act unless the detainee was
physically present in the United States or owned property
therein. 319
Examining more recent United States case law, the majority
was particularly convinced that the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson v. Eisentrager,320 "end[ed] any doubt about the scope of
common law habeas. '32 1 In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court had
stated:
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any
country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf
of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no
stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial
jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of the Constitution
extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.32 2
Judge Judith W. Rogers, dissenting, argued that it is
unconstitutional to deprive alien detainees the right to seek
habeas corpus. 323 According to Judge Rogers, aliens have a right
to petition for a writ of habeas corpus and that right may only be
suspended by Congress upon a finding that the public safety
316. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (superseded by statute).
317. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988.
318. Id. at 989-90.
319. Id. at 990.
320. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
321. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990.
322. Id. (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768).
323. Id. at 995 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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requires it in cases of rebellion or invasion. 324 She reasoned that,
because Congress failed to make the requisite findings to properly
invoke the suspension of habeas, removal of federal court
jurisdiction over such petitions was unconstitutional.
Once the Boumediene decision was issued, it was expected
that the hundreds of habeas cases already filed in the federal
courts would not be heard, leaving alien unlawful enemy
combatants to challenge their detention in federal courts only
after the culmination of military proceedings and appeals
therefrom. At the time there were approximately 400 habeas
petitions pending that had been filed on behalf of unlawful enemy
combatants detained at Guantinamo.325
B. Supreme Court's Certiorari Review
In a final effort to strike down the Military Commissions Act,
the alien detainees petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. 326
The Supreme Court initially denied the detainees' petition
and, in an unusual move, 327 published a statement of two justices
respecting the denial, along with the opinion of three dissenting
justices who would have granted the petition.328 Justices Stevens
and Kennedy wrote, "despite the obvious importance of the issues
raised in these cases," in their opinion, the matter was not ripe for
the Court's review until the detainees had exhausted all other
avenues of appeal provided for by the MCA. 329
Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, however, disagreed,
contending that immediate review by the Court was warranted to
324. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
325. Josh White, Guantanamo Detainees Lose Appeal; Habeas Corpus
Case May Go to High Court, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2007, at Al.
326. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007). The Court consolidated
the petition for certiorari by the Boumediene detainees with the petition filed
by the detainees in Al Odah v. United States. See Letter from Neal Katyal to
The Honorable William K. Suter (Mar. 28, 2007) available at http://www.
scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Hamdan%203-2809%201etter.pdf (last
visited Aug. 14, 2007).
327. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 301 (8th ed.
2002). "Most orders of the Court denying petitions for writs of certiorari do
no more than announce the simple fact of denial, without giving any reasons
therefore." Id.
328. Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. 1478.
329. Id.
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"diminish the legal 'uncertainty' that now 'surrounds' the
application to Guantinamo detainees of this 'fundamental
constitutional principle.' 3 30
It was thought that the Supreme Court's denial of the petition
for certiorari would allow the high court to defer consideration of
the question until after the alien detainees exhausted the appeal
procedures provided in the MCA. 33 1 In a most surprising turn of
events, approximately three months after its denial of certiorari,
the Supreme Court changed course and granted the petition. 332
Despite the unusual nature of the Supreme Court's abrupt
change of position, it offered no explanation. In the view of some
commentators, it was the result of a change of heart on the part of
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who had first been opposed to
granting certiorari. 333 Others suspect that the Court's reversal of
its previous order was in response to an affidavit submitted by a
military insider. 334 In support of their petition for a rehearing on
whether the court would grant certiorari, lawyers for the
detainees filed with the Supreme Court on June 22, 2007 the
seven-page affidavit of Lieutenant Colonel Stephen E. Abraham,
who had been assigned to the Pentagon unit charged with running
the hearings at Guant.namo. 335  In his affidavit, Abraham
described the hearings as flawed and likened the review process to
a rubber-stamp system. 336 Still, others have speculated that the
330. Id. at 1479 (quoting Brief for United States Senator Arlen Specter as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct.
1478 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196)).
331. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Turns Down Detainees' Habeas
Corpus Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A18.
332. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1478 (2007), cert. granted, Boumediene v. Bush, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June
29, 2007) (No. 06-1195).
333. See William Glaberson, In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees'
Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at Al. The Supreme Court will grant
plenary review of a certiorari case if a minimum of four justices favor
granting the petition. See STERN, supra note 327, at 296.
334. See William Glaberson, Unlikely Adversary Arises to Criticize
Detainee Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at Al.
335. Appendix to Reply Brief of Petitioners to Opposition to Petition for
Rehearing at i-viii, Al Odah v. United States, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. 2007)
(No. 06-1196).
336. Id. Even assuming the truth of Abraham's allegations, these
allegations do not make the process itself unlawful. If there are abuses of the
system, these need to be corrected but they do not invalidate the system
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Supreme Court's order constitutes a signal that the Court is
seeking an opportunity to dissolve the facility at Guant.namo Bay
altogether. 337  If this is, indeed, the motivation behind the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, that would be quite
remarkable given the fact that three justices in the Hamdan
majority joined Justice Breyer's concurrence and expressly invited
Congress to authorize the military commissions there.33 8
Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court did not indicate how the
individual justices voted on the decision to grant certiorari, it is
impossible to know with certainty what prompted such a change
of course. 339
itself.
337. Carol Rosenberg, Supreme Court to Review Guantanamo Detainee
Case, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, June 30, 2007, at Al. It is the view of
the writers of this law review article that significant harm would result from
closing the Guantdnamo Bay facility and integrating detainees into American
prisons. Consider, for example, the mayhem that resulted when Irish
Republican Army members were interned at the Maze Prison near Lisburn,
County Antrim. The Maze Prison, which housed the bulk of the paramilitary
prisoners among some of the "most hardened killers and bombers," is known
for events that "reverberated far beyond the walls of its notorious H-blocks,"
including the dirty protest, hunger strikes, murders, riots, and, most notably,
the largest break-out of prisoners. See Doors closing for last time at 'unique'
prison, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/n.ireland/maze.html.
It would be irresponsible to integrate those detained at Guantdnamo into
the United States prison system. According to John B. Bellinger III, senior
legal advisor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, roughly ten percent of
the hundreds of individuals who have been released from Guantinamo have
returned to fight against the United States in Afghanistan. Embassy of the
United States, Press Release, Releasing Guantanamo Detainees Would
Endanger World, U.S. Says, May 25, 2006, available at
http://london.usembassy.gov/terror670.html.
We cannot make the mistake of allowing such enemies to infiltrate our
prisons and to indoctrinate those incarcerated therein with their
insurrectionary ideology. Indeed, as one United States Representative has
noted, "there's a real damage and a real danger in bringing people that know
how to make car bombs, who are experts with explosives, and putting them in
proximity with American prisoners and American criminals who might pick
up their capability." The Military Commissions Act and the Continued Use of
Guantanamo Bay as a Detention Facility: Hearing of the House Armed
Service Committee, 153 CONG. REC. D 439 (2007) (statement of Rep. Duncan
Hunter (R-Ca.)).
338. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799, 2808 (2006). The four
justices joining in Justice Breyer's concurrence were Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg. See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Justices Tacitly Backed
Use of Guantdnamo, Bush Says, N.Y TIMES, July 8, 2006, at A14.
339. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799, 2808.
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With the question now before the Supreme Court as to
whether it is constitutional to detain alien unlawful enemy
combatants at Guantdnamo without affording them the right to
habeas corpus relief, those critical of the MCA system argue for
the facility's closure at Guantdnamo Bay.340
VI. MAKING SMALL SACRIFICES FOR THE SAKE OF NATIONAL SECURITY
"The laws will.., not be silent in time of war, but they will
speak with a somewhat different voice."3 4 1
September 11, 2001 marked, or should have been, an
awakening for the United States. We realized that our nation's
borders were not secure. We became aware of the vulnerability of
the nation that we had worked so rigorously to become. And we
perceived the real possibility that our country's political, economic,
and societal foundations were in great danger.
The risk that our country faces today is very grave,34 2 yet
many Americans turn a blind eye to this stark reality. Perhaps
those who so willfully blind themselves to reality are in thrall of
the notion that ignorance is bliss. 34 3 Certainly, amid the friction
and abrasion in what President Lincoln called, "the race of life, '344
it is all too easy to ignore the likelihood of another terrorist
attack-even though we are periodically reminded of this harsh
reality when law enforcement officials and the office of Homeland
Security inform us of recently foiled terrorist plots. 34 5 To put the
harm our nation might endure in perspective, consider that more
340. See Thom Shanker & David Johnston, Legislation Could be Path to
Closing Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A10.
341. REHNQUIST, supra note 58, at 225.
342. President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 109, Jan. 28, 2003 ("It
would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring
a day of horror like none we have ever known.").
343. Thomas Gray, "Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College" (1742), as
reprinted in THOMAS GRAY, 1 THE WORKS OF THOMAS GRAY 17 (1884) (coining
the phrase "ignorance is bliss").
344. Abraham Lincoln, Speech to Special Session of Congress (July 4,
1861), as reprinted in 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 438.
345. See Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Four
Individuals Charged in Plot to Bomb John F. Kennedy International Airport
(June 2, 2007), at http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel07/plot
060207.pdf [hereinafter DOJ Press Release of June 2, 2007].
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than 620,000 lives were lost throughout the four years of the Civil
War.346 Today, at least that many lives would be lost in just one
day if we were to undergo a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack
by a terrorist. 347 In today's War on Terror, the government must
do what is necessary to ensure the nation's security. President
Bush has warned that "we must never make the mistake of
thinking the danger of terrorism has passed."348 The Department
of Justice's announcement in early June of 2007 that four
individuals were being charged with conspiring to attack the John
F. Kennedy International Airport by blowing up the airport's
major jet-fuel supply tanks and pipeline further validated the
President's forewarning. 349 Likewise, reports that al Qaeda may
have active cells in the United States further confirm that the
threat of another attack continues. 350 Surely "[a] democracy can
allow its leaders one fatal mistake-and that's what 9/11 looks like
to many observers-but Americans will not forgive a second
one."
35 1
In seeming forgetfulness of the grief and sorrow that tugged
at America's heart and hearth on and after September 11, 2001,
the Bush administration faced sharp criticism from many who
believed that the government was trampling on certain civil
liberties of individuals. 352 They claim that the government has
346. Williams, supra note 102, at 2.
347. Id. See also Michael Ignatieff, Op-Ed, Lesser Evils, N.Y. TIMES, May
2, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 46:
Consider the consequences of a second major attack on the mainland
United States - the detonation of a radiological or dirty bomb,
perhaps, or a low-yield nuclear device or a chemical strike in a
subway. Any of these events could cause death, devastation and
panic on a scale that would make 9/11 seem like a pale prelude.
348. George W. Bush, President's Radio Address (Aug. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/print/20060812.html.
349. See Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Four
Individuals Charged in Plot to Bomb John F. Kennedy International Airport
(June 2, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07
nsd401.html.
350. Lolita C. Baldor, Officer fears al-Qaida cells already in U.S.,
PROVIDENCE J., July 25, 2007, at Al.
351. Ignatieff, supra note 347. See also Taranto, supra note 257 (opining
that "[1]eniency toward detainees is on the table today only because al Qaeda
has so far failed to strike America since 9/11").
352. See, e.g., Editorial, American Liberty at the Precipice, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2007, at A22; Editorial, A Spy Program in From the Cold, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A26; Stephen Budiansky, Op-Ed, Military Justice
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unduly elevated its commitment to national security and
circumvented the civilian court system.
No one disputes that the laws of war 353 are different. 354 We
play by different rules in the midst of a national emergency-rules
that are not always chivalrous or entirely in accord with all of the
constitutional provisions that apply in ordinary times.355 The
point is that this is "no ordinary time. '356 Our founders never
intended that we risk the nation's security by reading the
Constitution in a myopic and non-holistic manner. One of the
founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton, noted in 1801 that '[w]ar,
of itself, gives to the parties a mutual right to kill in battle, and to
capture the persons and property or each other.' ' 3 57 Hamilton
recognized that "the Constitution does not require specific
congressional authorization for such actions, at least after
hostilities have commenced. ' 358  In Hamilton's view, "'[tihe
framers would have blushed at a provision, so repugnant to good
sense, so inconsistent with national safety and convenience. '' 359
On the basis of considerations of that nature, American law
has long recognized that national security concerns are sometimes
Goes AWOL, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at A15. See generally DAVID COLE &
JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2006).
353. The laws of war are "[t]he body of rules and principles observed by
civilized nations for the regulation of matters inherent or incidental to the
conduct of a public war, such as the relations of neutrals and belligerents,
blockades, captures, prizes, truces and armistices, capitulations, prisoners,
and declarations of war and peace." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 904 (8th ed.
2004). See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
218 n.2 (7th ed. 2004) (defining the law of war as "a branch of international
law that prescribes the rights and obligations of belligerents and other
persons resident in a theatre of war").
354. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, The Terrorists'
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A23.
355. See, e.g., Mark Agrast, Restoring the Rule of Law, Center for
American Progress, June 30, 2006, available at http://www.americanprogress.
org/issues/2006/06/bl833 225.html.
356. See generally DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, No ORDINARY TIME: FRANKLIN
AND ELEANOR ROOSEVELT: THE HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II (1995).
357. Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Op-Ed, The law and war; U.S.
right to detain combatants, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at A19 (quoting
Alexander Hamilton, "The Examination, No. 1, 17 Dec. 1801," reprinted in 3
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prioritized over particular constitutional guarantees. Even where,
unlike the habeas corpus provision, the Constitution does not
explicitly allow for exceptions, the Supreme Court has declined to
view civil liberties in a radically absolute fashion-as though they
existed in an abstract vacuum. For example, while our Bill of
Rights guarantees that Congress will not abridge freedom of
speech or of the press, 360 there is general agreement that these
guarantees must, on occasion, be subordinated to considerations of
the exigencies of national security.36 1
Despite the existence of instances in our history when the
strictletter of one or other provision of the Constitution have been
subordinated to national security considerations, some Americans
nonetheless question the notion that the threats of today's War on
Terror justify the careful and temporary subordination of some
constitutional provisions to other values. As we describe below,
such critics are in error.
A. Trial by Military Commission Rather Than by the American
Criminal Justice System is Vital to Preserving National Security.
At the heart of the debate over holding detainees captive
during the War on Terror is the need for a military court system
at all. Many protest that the United States should try all
suspected terrorists in the American criminal justice system and
not in military courts that enforce the laws of war.362 To do so,
however, would in effect be an attempt to squeeze a round peg into
360. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
361. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (indicating that
the principle that publications should be immune from prior restraint "is not
absolutely unlimited" and stating that "[n]o one would question but that a
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publications of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops."); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("When a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right.").
362. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Tribunal System, Newly Righted, Stumbles
Again, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at A21 (quoting Steven R. Shapiro, legal
director of the American Civil Liberties Union, who contended that "[t]he
time is long overdue for all these cases to be transferred to military courts-
martial or civilian courts.").
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a square hole.363 The criminal justice system is not only ill-suited
for such wartime trials, but its rules and procedures would likely
foster rather than thwart further terrorist attacks. 3
6 4
The policy of detaining unlawful enemy combatants at
Guantdnamo and trying them before a military commission is
vital to the effort to prevent further terrorist attacks. Contrary to
the belief of some, "detention is not a penal sanction; it is the
fortune of war. ' 36 5 Indeed, detaining suspected unlawful enemy
combatants serves a twofold purpose. First, in light of the Office
of Homeland Security's belief that al Qaeda operatives will plan
other attacks, detaining those individuals who are capable of
spearheading such an operation brings us one step closer to
thwarting such an imminent attack.3 66 Secondly, yet equally as
important, detaining suspected terrorists enables American
military personnel to obtain critical information from those with
knowledge of future attacks on the United States.36 7
To achieve these ends, the laws of war, which are unlike our
civilian criminal justice system in this regard, enable American
military forces to attack enemies without notice and hold them
captive until the end of hostilities. 368 While the American civilian
criminal justice system would require the government to first
indict suspects, arrest them without the use of excessive force, and
363. Even some opponents of the administration's detention policies
recognize that the civilian criminal justice system is ill-suited for the trial of
unlawful enemy combatants. For example, Professor Neal K. Katyal of
Georgetown University Law Center has acknowledged that, "it's not realistic
to think that all people can be tried in an ordinary criminal court." Shanker,
supra note 340.
364. See Taranto, supra note 257 (noting that granting constitutional
protections to detainees would (1) endanger the lives of American civilians,
(2) afford preferential treatment to enemy fighters who defy the rules of war
and (3) make a mockery of international humanitarian law).
365. David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, Op-Ed, The law and war,
Protecting the innocents, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2004, at A23.
366. Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 1, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-
1027). See also William Glaberson, Pentagon Study Sees Threat In
Guantdnamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2007, at A15 (noting that a
recent report by a terrorism study center at West Point revealed that many
detainees held captive at Guantdnamo during 2004 and 2005 were a proven
threat to United States forces).
367. Glaberson, supra note 334; Rivkin, supra note 365.
368. David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, Op-Ed, The law and war; Are
we at war?, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at A19.
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fully Mirandize them, "[t]he right to detain enemy combatants
during wartime is one of the most fundamental aspects of the
customary laws of war. ' 36 9 Military officials need not establish
probable cause nor do they need to secure an arrest warrant from
a neutral and detached magistrate in order to capture perceived
enemy fighters. 370 Significantly, the laws of war do not require
the giving of Miranda warnings when capturing an enemy, nor do
they require adherence to the legal niceties of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 371 As Professor Ruth Wedgwood quipped:
"U.S. Marines may have to burrow down an Afghan cave to smoke
out the leadership of al Qaeda. It would be ludicrous to ask that
they pause in the dark to pull an Afghan-language Miranda card
from their kit bag. This is war, not a criminal case. '372
While the laws of war are specially designed for all periods of
armed conflict, they are particularly suited for the new-age
warfare evidenced by the War on Terror. Al Qaeda's suicide
attacks have demonstrated that many of its members have an
utter disregard for their own lives, thereby lessening the deterrent
value of bloodshed inflicted by opponents. In their quest to
destroy our nation, information is the only precious gem that al
Qaeda members seek desperately to shield from American view. 373
It is that intelligence, relating to anticipated al Qaeda attacks,
that the United States desperately needs.374 Without the ability
to capture enemy combatants and immediately interrogate them
to obtain such intelligence, the likelihood of victory in the War on
Terror would become substantially more remote.
369. Casey, supra note 357.
370. MCA, supra note 6, at § 949a (2)(B).
371. John Dean, The Critics are Wrong: Why President Bush's Decision to
Bring Foreign Terrorists to Justice Before Military Tribunals Should Not
Offend Civil Libertarians, FindLaw, Nov. 23, 2001, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20011123.html.
372. Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,
2001, at A18.
373. See Winik, supra note 153 ("It is commonly agreed that our greatest
breakthroughs in this war will most likely come not from military strikes or
careful diplomacy - needed and important as they both are - but from crucial
pieces of information: a lead about a terrorist cell; a confession from a
captured bin Laden associate; reliable intercepts warning that a new attack
is going to take place.").
374. Ruth Wedgwood, Lawyers at War, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2003, at A22.
See also John Keegan, INTELLIGENCE IN WAR: KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENEMY FROM
NAPOLEON TO AL-QAEDA 316-17 (2003).
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Moreover, the procedural rules that are characteristic of our
criminal justice system would further complicate the trial of
suspected terrorists and could jeopardize our nation's security.
Most notable are the rules of discovery, which mandate that the
government disclose to a criminal defendant any information in its
possession that can be deemed material to the accused, in addition
to any potentially exculpatory evidence. 375 To provide a suspected
terrorist with such extensive information could be deadly.
Andrew C. McCarthy, the former federal prosecutor who tried
twelve suspected terrorists following the 1993 attacks on the
World Trade Center, reflected upon the repercussions of trying
such individuals in federal court.376 According to McCarthy, the
broader an indictment is drawn, the more information that must
be disclosed.377 "This is a staggering quantum of information," he
wrote, "certain to illuminate not only what the government knows
about terrorist organizations, but the methods and sources used
by intelligence agencies in obtaining that information as well.
378
If anyone would know the consequences of adhering to the
federal rules of discovery, it would be McCarthy, who served as a
prosecutor at Omar Abdel Rahman's trial for participation in the
1993 World Trade Center bombings. 3 79 McCarthy complied with
the discovery rules that govern criminal trials in the federal
courts and produced to the defense counsel a list of 200 possible
unindicted co-conspirators.3 80 Within days of its production in
court, the list-"a sketch of American intelligence on al Qaeda"-
was delivered to Osama bin Laden in Sudan. 38 1 It is believed that
bin Laden, by inspecting the list and determining who was not
discovered, was able to deduce how American intelligence had
obtained this information.382 This disclosure-a mistake, which
had the potential of impeding American intelligence operations-
375. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
376. Andrew C. McCarthy, The Legal Challenge to the War on Terror, 9 J.
OF INT'L SEcuRITY AFFAIRS 43 (2005).
377. Id. at 48.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 43.
380. Andrew C. McCarthy, The Intelligence Mess: How it happened, what
to do about it, 117 COMMENTARY 11 (Apr. 1, 2004).
381. YOO, supra note 29, at 212.
382. Id.
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should not occur again. At the same time, this mistake should
teach us how "applying criminal justice rules to a national
security problem not only provides terror organizations with
precious intelligence they could never obtain on their own [but]
also threatens public safety by retarding inputs to our intelligence
community."383
In this same vein, inherent in a military commission trial is a
level of confidentiality that is absent from the criminal justice
system. Our American criminal justice system recognizes the
inherent value of open trials in ferreting out truth and preserving
faith and trust in the judicial system.384 Although certainly
valuable in the normal criminal trial, affording public access to
the military trials of suspected terrorists could jeopardize the
nation's security. 385  If classified information or the fruits of
American intelligence efforts were disclosed in open court, those
terrorists still at large would have the benefit of insight into our
military and intelligence operations, enabling those who continue
to plot against the United States to better disguise their plans and
carry them to fruition. 386 For example, according to an anecdote
referred to by President. Bush in the 1990s, a newspaper learned
that American intelligence had communicated with Osama bin
Laden though his cell phone.387 The President claimed that the
newspaper's publication of the fact prompted bin Laden to stop
using his phone, thereby preventing United States intelligence
from monitoring his activity. 388  Although the truth of the
anecdote has since been disputed, 389 most notably, the story
demonstrates the possible ramifications of the media's disclosing
confidential intelligence data. The potential effect of such
publicity on American intelligence operations is reason alone to be
383. McCarthy, supra note 376, at 48.
384. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986);
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
385. Yoo, supra note 29, at 212 ("In an ongoing war, the costs of openly
disclosing information can be very high.").
386. See id.
387. George W. Bush, Press Conference (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html.
388. Id.
389. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, File the Bin Laden Phone Leak Under 'Urban
Myths, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2005, at A2 (describing the anecdote as an
"urban myth").
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wary of trying detainees in the public federal court arena. While
generally there is unquestionably tremendous value in public
disclosure and media oversight of judicial processes, this value
must be subordinated at a time when national security could be
jeopardized.
Conducting the trial of detainees in open court would also
pose risks to those American citizens who would be called upon for
jury service. In early 2001, a jury trial commenced to prosecute al
Qaeda terrorists for conspiring in the bombings of two American
embassies in East Africa. 390 Despite the grave security concerns
with respect to the jurors' well-being and the court's guarantee to
jurors of anonymity, two years later the New York Times
published a lengthy article replete with personal identifiers of the
jurors.39 1 Although refraining from actually naming the jurors
whom the Times interviewed on the condition of anonymity, the
article detailed nine of the jurors' professions, race, and beliefs.392
Surely if al Qaeda operatives can surreptitiously wreak mass
destruction on the United States, they, like the New York Times,
can ascertain the identity of the male city employee from India or
the female born-again Christian art therapist working in the
greater New York City area.
In addition to issues involving court access, there are also
significant issues with respect to the use of the rules of evidence
that are otherwise available in federal court. 39 3 In the typical
criminal trial, numerous public policy concerns warrant the
exclusion of much potential evidence, largely because our trial
system does not entrust jurors with weighing the reliability of
certain information. 394 The most oft-cited example of the stifling
effect of these rigid rules of evidence is with respect to the
admissibility of hearsay evidence. Consider, for example, if
speculation is accurate that bin Laden phoned his mother shortly
before the September 11th attacks to warn her that a major event
390. Benjamin Weiser, A Jury Torn and Fearful in 2001 Terrorism Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, § 1, at 1.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. See Fed. R. Evid.
394. Yoo, supra note 29, at 218; Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism,
and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328, 330 (2002).
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was imminent.395 If bin Laden's mother told a close friend about
her son's telephone call, the admission of such evidence may be
problematic in a federal trial against an enemy combatant. 396
Military commission trials, however, obviate the problematic
nature of such evidence given that the MCA empowers judges to
admit that testimony which they deem reliable and probative. 397
By contrast with civilian courts, military commissions are also
staffed by military judges who are admitted to practice in federal
court or before the highest court of a state, 398 and who are better
suited than lay jurors to properly weigh the evidence before
them.399 Thus, much of the risk that would exist in a trial before a
jury of laypersons is eliminated when admitting such evidence
before a military commission.
In a similar vein, our federal court system is replete with
protections, such as the exclusionary rule, which keeps out of
court evidence that has been unlawfully seized by police.400 Such
a rule promotes proper adherence to police procedures that ensure
the integrity of our law enforcement system. 401  This
consideration, however, is irrelevant with respect to the means by
which the American military obtains evidence. It makes sense
that "[t]hese rules do not apply to war, because courtroom
outcomes do not 'regulate' how the military does their job on the
battlefield."402
Finally, also absent from the laws of war is the right of a
criminal defendant to confront his or her accusers. The United
States criminal justice system, as reflected in the Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Crawford v. Washington,403 affords defendants
such a right, but it would be virtually impossible to afford the
right of confrontation in the context of the current wartime
climate. Requiring accusers to appear in court and testify live
against unlawful enemy combatants would "substantially hinder
military operations by removing front-line soldiers and officers
395. Yoo, supra note 29, at 218; Wedgwood, supra note 394, at 330.
396. See Fed. R. Evid. 801 and 802.
397. See MCA, supra note 6, at § 949a(b)(2)(E)(ii).
398. Id. at § 948j.
399. YOO, supra note 29, at 218.
400. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
401. See WILLIAM LAFAVE, et al., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1 (4th ed. 2004).
402. YOo, supra note 29, at 218.
403. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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from the battlefield to prepare and to offer testimony before a
tribunal. '404 Additionally, intelligence agents and other sources
could be required to appear in court despite the fact that the
government has worked for so long to conceal their identity, let
alone, their existence.405 "Requiring these witnesses to appear in
court heightens the possibility of their exposure, endangering the
agent's safety and compromising [the nation's] access to vital
intelligence concerning the location of terrorist cells and plans for
future terrorist strikes. '40 6
Admittedly, these many procedural aspects of the American
criminal justice system are absent from military commission trials
conducted under the laws of war. Yet, under these circumstances,
this is lawful. Unlawful enemy combatants are protected under
Common Article 3 of Geneva III, which mandates that they be
afforded "all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples. '407 It in no way specifies that
unlawful enemy combatants must be afforded all protections made
available to American citizens under our Constitution. Rather, as
Justice Stevens explained in Hamdan,40 8 Article 75 of the
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions details many of the
judicial guarantees that are deemed "indispensable by civilized
peoples. '40 9 A comparison of the MCA and these indispensable
guarantees reveals that the two are strikingly similar.
Even some who are staunchly opposed to the Guantinamo
military commissions agree that detainees need not be given the
full panoply of criminal protections. 4 10 Georgetown law professor,
404. Brief for Former Attorneys General of the United States et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27-28, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.
Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Morris D. Davis, Op-Ed, The Guantdnamo I Know, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2007, at A21 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Part I, art. III, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S.
135).
408. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006).
409. Id. (citing 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, arts. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978)).
410. Goldsmith, supra note 354. Katyal represented Hamdan and
persuaded the Supreme Court to strike down the Guantinamo tribunals. Id.
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Neal Katyal, who represented Hamdan, has admitted that "[a]
detainee may not be able to meet his lawyer right away if
interrogation has just begun. A terrorist captured in Afghanistan
should not be able to seek release because he was not read his
Miranda rights."411  While Katyal would support the
establishment of a national security court as a branch of the
United States federal court system, there appears no persuasive
reason for doing so. 412 The military commissions, as presently
constituted, strike a proper balance between the rights of
detainees and national security needs. In addition, detainees are
afforded protections by all three branches of government. First,
the military commissions themselves are constituted under the
legislative and executive branches, which makes sense given that
the laws of war operate under Articles I and II of our Constitution.
Second, if these protections are insufficient, detainees are afforded
a right of access to Article III courts. Katyal's proposal would
have little effect other than to confuse and further confound the
separation of powers upon which our democracy is founded.
Importantly, in exchange for some of the protections available
in the American civilian court system, the MCA otherwise affords
detainees a full panoply of rights. 4 13 For example, detainees who
are charged with crimes are provided a copy of those charges in
their native language414 and those accused have the right to
challenge commission members. 415 Additionally, the MCA strictly
prohibits outside influence on witnesses and trial participants. 416
During the trial itself an accused may represent himself or may be
assisted by counsel.417 Like those accused in our criminal justice
system, detainees are presumed innocent until guilt is established
beyond a reasonable doubt.418 Finally, just as would be true in a
civilian court pursuant to double jeopardy principles, a detainee
may not be tried a second time for the same offense.419
The admissibility of hearsay evidence during a military
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Davis, supra note 407.
414. MCA, supra note 6, at § 948s.
415. Id. at § 949f.
416. Id. at § 949b.
417. Id. at § 949a(b)(C)-(D).
418. Id. at § 9491(c)(1).
419. Id. at § 349h.
STILL A FRIGHTENING UNKNOWN
commission trial has prompted the most debate, but it is
important to note, as have some commentators, the existence of
"robust safeguards '420 that come into play when such evidence is
at issue. Significantly, the parties are afforded not only the
opportunity to challenge the introduction of such evidence but also
the right to argue before the military judge the degree of weight
that should be afforded to the evidence should it be deemed
admissible. 421 A corresponding right such as this is absent from
the American criminal justice system, which relies on the trier of
fact to make independent credibility determinations.
Finally, one would be remiss to not recognize how much
treatment of detainees has changed since September 11, 2001.
Our government has confirmed that inflicting physical pain and
torture on detainees is simply unacceptable. 422 While in the
months following the terrorist attacks on our nation such methods
were authorized, our government soon recognized the inhumanity
of such treatment.423  Congress's passage of the DTA finally
outlawed humiliating and degrading treatment of detainees.424
The passage of the DTA makes untenable the position of those
who contend that the former employment of torture on detainees
justifies the Guant~namo Bay facility's closure.
If the United States is truly committed to safeguarding the
nation at this time of extreme peril, trial by military commission
is not only prudent but is indeed necessary to achieve that goal.
As one editorialist has noted, "By keeping terrorists out of
America, Guantanamo protects Americans' physical safety. By
keeping them out of our justice system, it also protects our
freedom." 425
B. The MCA Delays, but Does Not Abrogate the Right to Judicial
420. Davis, supra note 407.
421. Id. (summarizing the provisions of the MCA, supra note 6, at §
949a(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii)).
422. Graphic, Evolution of Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at
A14.
423. See id.; see also Executive Order: Blocking Property of Certain
Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq, July 17, 2007, available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070717-3.html (last
visited Aug. 6, 2007).
424. Graphic, supra note 422.
425. Taranto, supra note 257.
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Review.
Those who protest the Guantdnamo trials and the Military
Commissions Act do so under a decidedly false presumption. 426
Most of the act's critics focus on the fact that the MCA eliminates
the right of detainees to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 427
Such an interpretation ignores the multiple means of judicial
review afforded under the act. Importantly, both the MCA428 and
the DTA429 afford alien detainees the right to challenge their
status as unlawful enemy combatants.430 David B. Rivkin Jr.,
former White House counsel, has emphasized that detainees are
still afforded multiple avenues of judicial review: "The government
is saying, 'Look, we're not denying anyone's chance to get habeas,"'
he said. "We're just providing a different way."'431 Together, the
MCA and the DTA ensure that detainees receive a four-layered
review process, replete with protections that otherwise are not
required of Article 5 tribunals referenced by Geneva III and did
not apply to the military commissions that Franklin Roosevelt
convened during World War 11.432 According to Rivkin, the United
States Supreme Court has itself recognized the constitutionality of
substituting habeas corpus with an equivalent means of
challenging the legality of one's detention.433 Pointing to Swain v.
Pressley,434 he noted that the Supreme Court opined in that case
that, "the substitution [for traditional habeas procedure] of a
collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to
426. Posting of David B. Rivkin, YES: The MCA Provides Habeas and
Plenty of Process to Opening Argument, http://openingargument.com/ (Feb.
2007).
427. Guilty Until Confirmed Guilty, supra note 300; The Democrats'
Pledge, supra note 302; Hafetz, supra note 302; Posting of Richard Epstein,
NO: The MCA Denies Habeas and Due Process, http://openingargument.com/
(Feb. 2007).
428. MCA, supra note 6.
429. DTA, supra note 16.
430. See MCA, supra note 6; see also DTA, supra note 16.
431. Neil A. Lewis, Appeals Court Weighs Prisoners' Right to Fight
Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at A15.
432. See Detainees: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 110th
Cong. Apr. 26, 2007 (testimony of David B. Rivkin, Jr., Partner, Baker &
Hostetler LLP), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/
2007/April/Rivkin%2004-26-07.pdf [hereinafter Rivkin Testimony].
433. Id.
434. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
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test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 4 35 According to the
Supreme Court in Swain, the sole remaining inquiry therefore is
whether the substituted remedy is inadequate or ineffective.4 36
Certainly, one cannot seriously argue that the MCA and DTA with
their four levels of review before four separate bodies of jurists are
in any way inadequate or ineffective. The United States
government has stood firmly committed to affording "full and fair"
trials before military commissions. 437
Strikingly, the critics of these acts also ignore the point that
these protections are well in "excess of what our soldiers would be
afforded as prisoners of war. '4 38 If an American soldier were to be
taken into custody as a prisoner of war by nations harboring
terrorists, it is highly unlikely that he or she would receive civil
treatment of any kind.4 39
Detainees are already afforded rights far greater than
prisoners of war would receive under Geneva 111.440 Because it is
typical for military officials to interrogate prisoners of war
immediately upon their capture to "exploit their knowledge
concerning tactical positions," the Geneva Convention did not
expressly provide for counsel during such interrogation, let alone
the right of access to the courts to challenge their detention.44 '
Furthermore, the Geneva Convention does not afford prisoners
any right to release prior to the end of hostilities.4 4 2 To naively
435. Rivkin Testimony, supra note 432 (quoting Swain, 430 U.S. at 381).
436. Swain, 430 U.S. at 381.
437. See Gonzales, supra note 169 ("The suggestion that these
commissions will afford only sham justice like that dispensed in dictatorial
nations is an insult to our military justice system.").
438. Warner, supra note 303; see also Taranto, supra note 257; John Yoo,
Op-Ed, Congress to Courts: 'Get Out of the War on Terror,' WALL ST. J., Oct.
19, 2006, at A18 (explaining that the writ of habeas corpus has never been
understood as a right of prisoners of war).
439. See Mortimer B. Zukerman, New Rules for a New Age, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Feb. 13, 2005), available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
opinionlarticles/050221/2ledit.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2007).




442. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 224; see also
Rivkin Testimony, supra note 432 (noting that "the notion of enabling
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imagine that nations harboring terrorists would afford American
prisoners of war rights on a par with our constitutional right of
habeas corpus is to deny the real threat such individuals face
abroad.443
1. Constitutional Basis for Suspending Habeas in the Current
Wartime Climate
It is the position of these authors that the Bush
administration, with the concurrence of Congress, has chosen a
prudent, acceptable course. The United States Constitution
explicitly allows for the complete suspension of habeas corpus
rights during wartime, but the current administration recognized
that the more judicious approach would be to delay, not eliminate
the right of Article III court review. Nevertheless, what some
commentators fail to recognize is that, even if the President and
Congress were to suspend the right of habeas corpus and offer no
alternative means of Article III court review, such an action would
still be constitutional.
With respect to alien detainees, the suspension clause need
not even be invoked. As early as 1950, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the writ never has been granted for an alien
enemy who has at no relevant time been within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. 444 The Circuit Court's opinion in
Boumediene emphasized this fact noting that, even referring back
to English common law, the writ of habeas corpus was not
intended to be available to aliens beyond the Crown's
dominions.445 Discussions taking place at the time the framers
drafted the habeas corpus suspension clause confirms that that
the framers considered the writ a right afforded to American
captured enemy combatants to be released 'on parole' fell out of practice by
the late 19th Century" and that "the current U.S. practice of releasing
captured enemy combatants before the end of hostilities is historically
unprecedented."). It appears that many of the issues surrounding the
Guantdnamo Bay facility involve the length of time individuals are detained.
However, as Geneva III makes clear, even prisoners of war can be held until
the end of hostilities.
443. Warner, supra note 303; see also Taranto, supra note 257.
444. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950).
445. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1478, cert. granted, Boumediene v. Bush, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 29,
2007) (No. 06-1195).
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citizens, not all individuals. Consider, for example, James
McHenry's report back to the Maryland legislature about the
compromises made at the convention, which reflects his great
concern for the protection of citizens.44 6 To McHenry, unless
public safety required a suspension of habeas corpus, "the virtuous
Citizen [would] ever be protected in his opposition to power."44 7
While these discussions emphasized habeas corpus rights of
citizens, they did not include any consideration of the habeas
corpus rights of non-citizens, let alone alien enemy combatants.
The Circuit Court's Boumediene decision, charts a historical
and contemporaneous course that plausibly the Supreme Court
could follow to hold that the MCA does not unconstitutionally
deny alien detainees the opportunity to seek a writ of habeas
corpus.
With respect to American citizens, however, the issue is
admittedly more delicate and invokes consideration of the
suspension clause. The framers of our Constitution foresaw the
clash that would arise between personal liberties and national
security when the security concerns are genuine and immediate.
They believed that, when forced to weigh the value of the two,
personal liberties must recede. It was no accident that the
suspension clause was included in the Constitution. Our founding
fathers, while committed to affording civil liberties to American
citizens, recognized that in times of war, such a commitment was
not absolute. Significant debate regarding this proposition in
relation to the War on Terror relates to whether the United States
is, in fact, currently at war.
Many critics chide the MCA's removal of habeas corpus
jurisdiction, contending that the Constitution's explicit language
requires a "rebellion or invasion" before suspension is authorized.
Thus, they argue that more than the current War on Terror is
required to invoke this power.448 Such criticism is largely fueled
446. FREEDMAN, supra note 41, at 17 (citing Speech of James McHenry to
the Maryland House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), as reprinted in Eric M.
Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I: Just Because John Marshall
Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on
the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of
1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531 (2000)).
447. Id. (emphasis added).
448. Yoo, supra note 29, at 2 (citing PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM,
FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 20 (2003); Joyce Appleby &
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by the commentators' inability to reconcile traditional warfare
with the War on Terror. 449
The war America is fighting today is indisputably against a
different type of enemy and looks nothing like the battlefields of
yesterday. The impossibility of designating a particular nation
with whom to engage in battle does not make this conflict 'any less
a war.450 Al Qaeda operatives cannot shield themselves from
engagement in a formal war simply by not having uniformed
soldiers or a standing army. Nor can they cloak themselves with
innocence simply because there is not a "theater of battle in the
traditional sense. Rather, the battlefield stretches from Asia
through Africa and Europe and into the United States."451 As
such, it is understandably difficult to pinpoint our enemy. Only
two days after the September 11th attacks, White House Press
Secretary Ari Fleischer addressed reporters' concerns that the
inability to define a specific enemy means we are not at war.452
Fleischer cogently described the situation:
[T]his is a different type of enemy in the 21st century....
[T]his enemy is nameless; this enemy is faceless; this
enemy has no specific borders. This enemy does not have
airplanes sitting on tarmacs and it does not have ships
Gary Hart, The Founders Never Imagined a Bush Administration, George
Mason University's Hist. News Network, Aug. 27, 2006, available at
http://hnn.us/articles/23297.html.
449. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 13-15.
450. Some commentators suggest that the Bush administration has erred
in generalizing our current conflict as a War on Terror rather than targeting
particular groups against whom we are fighting. See, e.g., Power, supra note
157. Hilary Benn, the British secretary of state for international
development, warned against utilizing the catch-all umbrella term, War on
Terror, to describe various terrorist groups. Benn explained, "What these
groups want is to force their individual and narrow values on others, without
dialogue, without debate, through violence. And by letting them feel part of
something bigger, we given them strength." Id. Despite Benn's concerns, it
is irrelevant whether the government labels its military efforts a War on
Terror or specifically names each Islamic fascist group. What matters is that
individuals have deliberately calculated to terrorize America, requiring us to
respond with a global war to safeguard our nation.
451. Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 2, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-
1027).
452. Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-12.html.
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that move from one port city to the next. It is a different
kind of enemy.4 53
Nevertheless, Congress made great efforts to define the
enemy of the United States by its authorization of the President's
use of military force to combat the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.454 As specifically as possible, Congress authorized the
President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons."455
Arguably this was a formal declaration of war. But, even
assuming that the joint resolution did not constitute a formal
declaration of war against Iraq or the entities against which we
are fighting, the viability of the suspension clause would not be
affected. Indeed, in an age when wars are not always fought on
battlegrounds and often involve covert underground intelligence
operations, to assume that we are not at war because the
government has difficulty defining those entities against which we
are fighting would surely transform the suspension clause into a
hollow provision. There is no basis for believing that the framers
of the Constitution intended that habeas corpus be suspended only
after a formal declaration of war or during a civil war. Lending
further support to this contention is the fact that Article I, Section
9, Clause 2 contains no reference to a formal declaration of war. 456
Indeed, in its history the United States has only formally declared
war five times.457 It strains credulity to believe that a nation that
is reacting militarily and otherwise to the horrific attacks of
September 11, 2001 is not at war.
453. Id.
454. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
455. Id.
456. See Brief for Citizens for the Common Defence as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 6, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334,
03-343) ("The state of war does not depend on formalities such as a
declaration by Congress. The majority of wars fought by the United States
have not involved such a declaration.").
457. There were declarations of war with respect to the War of 1812, the
Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World
War II. Congress' role in war, U.S.A. TODAY (May 18, 2005), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/ nation/2002-10-08-congress-war.htm.
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In a tone that seems to reflect an insufficient appreciation of
the gravity of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Professor Bruce
Ackerman of Yale University Law School has instructed that "we
shouldn't lose all historical perspective: terrorism is a very serious
problem, but it doesn't remotely suggest return to the darkest
times of the Civil War or World War II. ' '458 Indeed, it is an
egregious over-generalization to declare that we have not returned
to the darkest times of the Civil War or World War II. The victims
of September 11th, their families, and the men and women of our
country who came forward to aid those in peril following the
devastating events of that day deserve more than that. Nothing
short of prevailing in the war against us by Islamic fascists who
threaten our nation's security will do them justice as well as
secure peace.
Others contend that the problem is not with the suspension of
habeas itself, but rather with the extent of such suspension. Only
weeks after the September 11, 2001 attacks, columnist Tony
Blankley stated that "[t]he danger to our liberties does not lie in
their temporary, legal suspension, but in the persistence of such a
suspension beyond the time needed to defeat the enemy. '459
Certainly, the United States has not yet defeated its enemy, and it
is wholly probable that releasing captured enemy combatants will
only make the war last longer as they return to fight against our
nation.46 0 Indeed, some have already returned to fight us.4 61 The
continuation of the War on Terror indicates that we have not yet
accomplished this vital mission. We remain a nation at war, and
as a nation at war we must do what is necessary to protect the
safety of our country and its citizens.
Finally, while the text of the Constitution makes it
abundantly clear that the suspension of habeas corpus during the
War on Terror is authorized, for those still not persuaded,
President Thomas Jefferson's thoughts, in reference to other
458. ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 20.
459. Tony Blankley, Op-Ed, Trade civil liberties for better security;
Congress should broaden government's powers immediately, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2001, at A21.
460. William Taft, Comment, Guantanamo detention is legal and essential,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at 19.
461. Press Release, Embassy of the United States, Releasing Guantanamo
Detainees Would Endanger World, U.S. Says (May 25, 2006), available at
http://london.usembassy.gov/terror670.html.
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political turmoil in our nation's infancy, should prove convincing:
A strict observance of the written law is doubtless one of
the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest.
The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our
country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose
our country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law,
would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property
and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus
absurdly sacrificing the ends to the means. 462
Perhaps President Lincoln saw the prescience in his
predecessor's advice. Over fifty years later, Lincoln too remarked
on the risk of reading the Constitution in a myopic manner at the
risk of the nation's survival. In Lincoln's words: "Are all the laws,
but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces,
lest that one be violated? 4 63
As we continue to fight the War on Terror, the need to
temporarily suspend the habeas corpus rights of some citizens is
even greater than it was during the Civil War or World War II
given the availability of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
of mass destruction. Furthermore, al Qaeda has quickly
recognized that, by recruiting American citizens to support their
cause, these individuals can utilize the United States Constitution
to shield themselves from lengthy detention without court review
and from excessive interrogation. 464 We must not allow our
Constitution to be utilized in such a way.
2. History's Lessons
Unlike the 1860s, the United States exists in a different
global village465 today. Yet, the parallels between President
462. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to J. B. Colivn (Sept. 20, 1810), as reprinted
in IV MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 149-50 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph, ed., F. Cars & Co.
1829).
463. Abraham Lincoln, Speech to Special Session of Congress (July 4,
1861), as reprinted in 4 COLL. WORKS, supra note 2, at 430.
464. Wedgwood, supra note 374; Ruth Wedgwood, The Enemy Within,
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2002, at A12.
465. Global village is a term coined by Wyndham Lewis in America and
Cosmic Man; the term was later popularized by Marshall McLuhan's The
Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man, where it is used to
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Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War and
the current executive and legislative branch's delay of Article III
court review during the War on Terror are remarkable. What is
shocking is the failure by many to put the current crisis, including
war making in historical perspective. As always, there is much to
be learned from history.466
Like Lincoln, President Bush refused to be a passive actor at
a time when the nation's security was jeopardized. Instead, both
men acted prudently, taking the action they deemed both
necessary and proper under the circumstances. 467  Lincoln
responded to the exigencies of war with the widespread
suspension of habeas corpus. Faced with similar exigencies, Bush
responded by delaying the time during which detainees, non-U.S.
citizens, could seek Article III court review. Despite the fact that
the threat to national security today is at least as great as Lincoln
encountered during the Civil War, the Bush administration has
come nowhere as close as Lincoln in affecting civil liberties
afforded by the Constitution. During the Civil War under the
aegis of the Lincoln administration there were 75,961 Union army
trials.468 Of these, 5,460 were trials before military commissions
and most were trials of civilian United States citizens. 46 9 One
commentator described Lincoln as having exercised "a wide range
of extraordinary powers ... as a matter of necessity to insure the
survival of the state.''470 Although it was necessary, President
describe a historical period. See WYNDHAM LEWIS, AMERICA AND COSMIC MAN
(1949); see also MARSHALL McLuHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY: THE MAKING
OF TYPOGRAPHIC MAN (1962).
466. Editorial, What would Abe do?: Lincoln's presidency is a lesson for
today, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 20, 2006; McClerren, supra note 67.
467. Mackubin Thomas Owens, War and Peace: Lincoln and Bush on
Vigilance and Responsibility, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 21, 2005 ("The
means to preserving the end of republican government are dictated by
prudence, which according to Aristotle is, the virtue most characteristic of the
statesman.").
468. E-mail from Thomas P. Lowry, Historian and Author (Dec. 8, 2005,
17:33 EST) (on file with authors) (reporting his research in National Archives
Record Group 153).
469. Id.
470. CUTLER, supra note 95, at 146. See also JAMES G. RANDALL, LINCOLN:
THE LIBERAL STATESMAN 123 (1947) ("No president has carried the power of
presidential edict and executive order (independently of Congress) so far as
he did."). President Lincoln's authorization of a blockade of the South and
expansion of the army were among the extraordinary steps he took to protect
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Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was radical in
comparison with provisions of the Military Commissions Act,
which merely supplants the right of habeas corpus with an
intricate appellate review process, including eventual review by
an Article III court. Indeed, "[e]very previous wartime president
imposed far more Draconian security restrictions than any now
contemplated-without any corrosive, long term effect on
society."4 71
Despite Lincoln's acts, the Supreme Court's decision in
Milligan, although ultimately ruling that Milligan had the right to
habeas corpus, validates the principle that Congress may suspend
the Great Writ. Although the Court concluded that the
suspension did not apply to Milligan, who was not a member of
the Confederate forces and was not captured on the battlefield, the
decision paved the way for the suspension of habeas corpus with
respect to alien enemy combatants today. Complicating the
suspension clause and Milligan's holding is that warfare today is
markedly different from that employed during the Civil War and
even in World War II. Today we are fighting a global war on
multiple battlegrounds, spanning several continents that is
largely driven by intelligence operations, and not lines of battle.
It is therefore difficult to define who, under Milligan, has been
captured on battlefields. Further complicating the problem is the
arduous task of determining who is a member of the Taliban or of
al Qaeda, thereby making it difficult to define who falls within
Milligan's category of individuals whose habeas rights can be
suspended. Although these inquires are difficult, such difficulty is
by no means a reason to justify jeopardizing national security.
the Union. MCPHERSON, supra note 69, at 210 (noting that both actions were
"an apparent violation of the Constitution").
471. Winik, supra note 153 (noting that the Bush administration's
restriction on liberties pales in comparison to the restrictions that occurred
under Presidents John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and
Franklin Roosevelt). See also POORE, supra note 97, at 210 (describing the
Lincoln administration's suspension of two newspapers-the Chicago Times
and the New York World-during the Civil War).
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VII. CONCLUSION
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute
the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of
my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States. '472
Two hundred and thirty one years later the unalienable rights
cherished by our founding fathers have not vanished. We are still
a nation firmly committed to affording civil liberties. But, in the
current wartime climate, amidst the terror that has jeopardized
our country and many other nations, we have increased our
commitment to national security. Indeed, it has been recognized
that "without a strong defense, there's not much expectation or
hope of having other freedoms. '473
As tension continues among our three branches of
government during the War on Terror it is imperative that the
Supreme Court recognizes the value in the constitutional balance
achieved by the MCA when the Court considers that issue in
Boumediene v. Bush this fall. Although the majority party in
Congress has vowed to revisit the MCA,474 it is important that the
judiciary respond by upholding its constitutionality. As the War
on Terror continues without any end in sight, the primary goal of
protecting and defending our country should remain a priority.
While civil liberties unquestionably are of great importance to
America's viability, such liberties would be worthless without the
assurances of a secure nation.
Unquestionably, a society that prizes some civil liberties more
than its personal security will eventually fall, as it will be without
a means of thwarting those who seek to destroy it. 475 The United
States government's efforts would undoubtedly be hindered
without the full, unrestricted ability to protect its citizens. We
must accept temporary476 infringements on .certain civil liberties
472. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (prescribing the oath to be recited by
every President upon entering office).
473. Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power: The legal mind behind the White
House's war on terror, THE NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, at 47.
474. See, e.g., S.4060, Effective Terrorists Prosecution Act of 2006, Nov.
16, 2006; S.185, The Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007, Jan. 7, 2007.
475. Mayer, supra note 473.
476. These infringements are, in fact, temporary. Even during the Civil
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to curb future acts of terrorism on our soil.4 77  Our nation's
survival depends on it.
War, when Abraham Lincoln saw the end of the war in sight, he advised his
generals to lighten up and restore habeas corpus. Numerous letters
expressing these sentiments are reprinted in 6 COLL. WORKS, supra note 87,
at 210-15.
477. POSNER, supra note 40, at 88-89. Posner makes the comparison
between the infringement on civil liberties and the Fourth Amendment
search and seizure requirements. By requiring that searches be based on
probable cause, which was an invention of the Supreme Court, the Fourth
Amendment ensures protection from "unreasonable search and seizure." Id.
This is, of course, analogous to the balance between an individual's need for
privacy and the public's need for security. Id.
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